



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WAR OR PEACE

A PRESENT DUTY AND
A FUTURE HOPE

BY

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BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. A., RETIRED

AUTHOR OF "THE AMERICAN FUR TRADE OF THE FAR WEST"

"YELLOWSTONE NATIONAL PARK, HISTORICAL
AND DESCRIPTIVE," ETC.

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CHICAGO
A. C. McCLURG & CO.

1911

WAR OR PEACE

A PRESENT DAY

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1911

Published February, 1911

Entered at Stationers' Hall, London, England

CHICAGO
A. C. McCLURG & CO.

W. H. Hall Printing Company
Chicago

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CHAPTER I
MISTAKEN SANCTIONS OF WAR

WAR OR PEACE

CHAPTER I

MISTAKEN SANCTIONS OF WAR

INTRODUCTION

THE abolition of war, to which increasing numbers are looking with genuine faith as a reality of the near future, is the largest proposition ever yet conceived by the mind of man. WAR—oldest of human institutions—the one thing permanent in a world of ceaseless change! Something justifies its existence or it would not have survived so long. With all its attendant evils, has it not been the principal means in the past of resisting injustice, oppression, and public wrong of whatever nature? Has it not been the most powerful agency in the growth of civilization and its conquest over barbarism? Is it not true, as one writer puts it, that, “from Marathon to Mukden, nearly all questions of

political and racial freedom have been decided on the battlefield"? And is not the continuing preparation for war an active force in the promotion of scientific progress and the material well-being of mankind?

To all this the militarist returns an affirmative answer and repeats his favorite argument that, because these things have been true of the past, they will also be true of the future, and that war has not by any means outlived its usefulness. But right here the pacifist takes issue with him, maintaining that the whole argument for permanent peace rests upon the fact that the future of war *cannot* be judged from its past. War, from his point of view, *has* practically outlived its usefulness. Old causes of war are disappearing and new methods of settling disputes, where causes have not been removed, are coming into vogue. The world stands on the threshold of a new era. On this difference of viewpoint hangs the whole question, however much it may be obscured, through ignorance or design, by collateral issues. If war still has a vital function to perform in the

advancement of civilization, it cannot be done away with and it would be useless to attempt it. But if the functions it once performed have become obsolete, or if a more efficient force has arisen to replace it, then the justification for its continuance is no longer apparent.

I — INFLUENCE UPON CIVILIZATION

That war has played a mighty part in human progress is indeed very true. While it is quite untrue that there has been no progress in civilization without war, as an American general has said, and equally untrue that war is an indispensable agency in such progress, the universality of war in the past has caused every movement of civilization to be mixed up with it. The civilizations of Greece and Rome were fostered by successful war, through the power which it gave to those nations of levying tribute upon the rest of the world. It secured them a degree of wealth and leisure not to be had otherwise, yet essential to those marvellous intellectual developments which remain the delight and admiration of the

race. But these results were won at the cost of ruin to many other nations, civilized and barbarian, and finally of their own decay in all except those treasures of art and literature which have survived the ravages of time. Whether the account shows a balance of good or evil is, however, quite immaterial to our present purpose. The ancient order of things has forever passed away, and it was so unlike the present as to be utterly valueless for guidance.

In modern times certain wars have aided human progress in ways that would apparently have been impossible without them. The winning of the territory of North America to Anglo-Saxon civilization is an example. It was war that transferred the northern colonies of France to England; it was the pressure of war in Europe that gave Louisiana to the United States, and it was war that continued the work by carrying the territory of the United States westward through Spanish possessions to the Pacific Ocean. In other instances modern war has been an accelerating, rather than an indispensable, force in political and

social progress. The results of such wars, in the same or equivalent forms, would doubtless have followed through slower evolutionary processes. Napoleon's work gave the finishing touches to the overthrow of the feudal system in Europe and crippled beyond recovery the power of the theocracy of Rome in its stubborn fight against the progressive tendencies of modern thought. The short sharp wars in the twelve-year period, 1859-71, accomplished the unification of Italy and of Germany. On the American continent the War of the Revolution, the great Civil War, and the war with Spain produced results which would otherwise have been long delayed, and the same is true of the Boer War in South Africa. In these and other examples that might be cited, war swept away at a single stroke the accumulated rubbish of centuries and achieved instant results which, in the ordinary course, would have required long periods of time for their accomplishment.

Here again it is immaterial to our inquiry whether war, in examples like these, was an indis-

pensable agency of progress or not. The questions over which they were fought have been permanently disposed of and it is difficult to foresee how they can arise again. They are, therefore, not legitimate evidence of the utility or necessity of war, so far as the future is concerned. Moreover, while militarism has occasionally accelerated progressive movements, it has far oftener retarded them. An example of this is furnished by the history of Turkey. For more than a century a condition of affairs has prevailed in that country which war should have set at rights, for nothing short of physical force was equal to the prodigious cleaning of Augean stables there required. But the jealousies of the Great Powers, fostered mainly by militarism, have made it impossible to agree upon a line of action, and this plague spot has remained upon the map of Europe, a continuing crime against civilization. Contrast with this supineness of purpose the action of that non-military nation across the Atlantic which, single-handed and at a single stroke, abolished evil conditions near her own door

though less offensive to human decency than those of Turkey. In the one case, militarism has been so rampant as to result in impotence. In the other, the spirit of a people untrammelled by military traditions or rivalries dealt with a question of humanity on its own merits, and despite its deficiency in military preparation, unhesitatingly resorted to force as soon as it became evident that nothing less was likely to accomplish the purpose.

Concerning the utility of war in the conquest of civilization over barbarism, the conclusion again follows that it is no longer a necessary agency. The point may be waived that it is doubtful if the true happiness of uncivilized peoples has been promoted by imposing upon them the customs of civilization. Their own verdict has almost invariably been in the negative. The contrary view, however, has been the consistent claim of the more highly developed nations throughout the world's history. The barbarian has always been regarded a legitimate subject of exploitation, and the justification of this attitude has been the assumed advantage to the exploited peoples. If it be admitted

that this is a just prerogative of civilization, then indeed war has been a much used, if not useful, instrument in enforcing it. It has been a *necessary* instrument only because of the greed, injustice, and wrong of the powerful toward the weak, and the disregard of those very principles which should characterize civilization. This is why the resistance of innocent peoples (like our North American Indians) has sooner or later become aroused and armed conquest has followed on the hypocritical basis of the maintenance of order. In most instances where military subjugation has been resorted to, an enlightened policy of simple justice would have done the work more effectually. Wars of this class have been essentially unjust and unnecessary, and while they have accomplished a purpose, it has not been in the best way.

But whatever may be the truth of the matter, as applied to the past, it no longer has any bearing upon the question of the abolition of war. The subjugation of native races is now so far complete that all are under the control, more or less effective, of civilized nations, and any further subjugation

tion will be as an exercise of police power only. For a long time there will be punitive expeditions in many parts of the world to quell brigandage and other resistance to established authority, but these will rarely hereafter be of a magnitude to dignify by the term war.

II — WAR AS A SELECTIVE AGENCY

The argument is often advanced that war has been a selective agency in the evolution of the race, whereby the survival of the fittest, both among individuals and nations, has been promoted; and also that it has served a useful purpose in the restriction of population in overpopulated countries. The agency of war in race evolution has been the reverse of that above assumed. War, if long continued, causes deterioration of the physical vigor of the warring nations. The numerical loss in population is not the serious matter, but loss of the better quality. Franklin was perhaps the first to call attention to this fact. "Great wars," he said, "absorb the flower of the nation. The stout

and well-made men are to be found in the army”; to which one may add that the military profession has always attracted the brightest intellects. Both in its restriction upon marriage and in its destruction of life war thus destroys the most precious seed and leaves the inferior from which to propagate. In proportion as wars are long continued, and draw heavily upon the population, these deleterious effects are apparent. The campaigns of Napoleon were a mighty drain upon the vigor of the French people. It has been held that the average stature of the French was thereby diminished by more than an inch. How much their intellectual and moral stature was shrunken by that debauchery of crime, who can say? The decadence of the Roman people was due more to the waste of its best blood in war than to the causes commonly accepted. War reverses the process of natural selection and, instead of producing the survival of the fittest, produces the survival of the most unfit.

It is only fair to say, however, that this argument has much less application to recent times

than to those a century or further back. Even the greatest of modern wars are not long-continued enough to affect deeply the breeding process. Possibly, in some few of our Southern States, the destruction of the best blood by the Civil War was so great as to leave its mark upon the vigor of the people, but it has probably not affected the nation as a whole. The great losses of the Japanese and Russians in the late war form but a small per cent of the population of those nations. Moreover, the female sex remains in undiminished vigor. The actual deleterious influence, therefore, in a short-lived war cannot be great.

Concerning the assumed upward tendency of war in race evolution through the displacement of weaker by stronger peoples, that depends upon how far the displacement has been by extermination and how far by subjugation only. In actual numbers, the inferior races, with some exceptions, are more populous now than ever before, and as rapidly as they are brought more completely under higher sanitary conditions their growth in numbers will be accelerated. This is the case

with our own aboriginal peoples and the imported African races. Displacement of these races means only political displacement. They remain and are fruitful and multiply and help to replenish the earth after their kind quite as much as the higher intellectual races who exercise dominion over them. The real forces of race evolution are, therefore, not brought into play, however great may be the influence upon political evolution.

The old theory, still often advanced, that war is a necessary agency for keeping down population in densely populated countries has an atrocious aspect when looked squarely in the face as a means to an end. The world would instantly revolt at the matter-of-fact suggestion that a nation which feels itself overcrowded should select from its people those who are a charge to the State through natural infirmities and put them out of the way by any of the painless processes known to science, thus accomplishing at insignificant cost the double purpose of restricting population and improving its quality. But according to the militarist theory, there is nothing revolting

in the selection of the *best* individuals, and at enormous cost and a maximum of suffering and of loss to the State, putting them out of the way under the delusive spell of service to their country. The whole idea is heinous and is practically absurd. No nation has ever gone to war to reduce its population, and never will, for the practical reason, to omit all others, that it would injure its own stock by so doing. That overpopulation will yet present the greatest of world problems may well be admitted; but its solution, when that time comes, will not be found in war.

III—WAR AS A FORCE IN MATERIAL PROGRESS

With surer footing than in any of the foregoing political arguments, the militarist may claim that war and war preparation are potent factors in promoting the material well-being of mankind. Scientific research, for example, finds one of its chief stimuli in the necessities of war. Invention and discovery have been promoted thereby and their results have reacted throughout the whole field of industrial activity. The marvellous devel-

opment of high explosives is an example. Another is found in the similar development of steel which, under the stress of armor-plate and ordnance requirements, has been brought to such perfection in strength, hardness, tenacity and other useful qualities as to form practically a new material of construction. Still another example is the great improvement in instruments of precision, made necessary by the high requirements of military service. In truth, there are no more marvellous exhibitions of the products of inventive genius in the world to-day than are to be found in the modern enginery of war. If any one doubts this, let him make a careful study of a modern battleship or seacoast fortification.

Another outgrowth of military systems which, in Europe especially, has been of inestimable benefit to the people is the building of military roads. The example of the Romans has been followed by modern States on a more extensive scale and in a higher degree of perfection. To a large extent the magnificent highways throughout that vast territory are the outgrowth of military necessity,

and their economic value to the people of Europe transcends calculation. In a less, though very important degree, strategic railroads, canals, and seaports contribute to the public good.

Again, there is the far-reaching influence, reflected from military upon civil life, of the stern discipline and perfect organization necessary for the successful conduct of the great operations of war. There are the excellent maps and minute geographical knowledge collected for military uses, but available for any other purpose. In States where large standing armies are maintained and compulsory service is required, men become better acquainted with their country, losing something of their narrow provincialism, and gaining a broader and better view of their duties as citizens.

To these examples may be added the administrative work which army officers have done and are doing in many lands, maintaining order in difficult situations, conducting engineering enterprises and rendering valuable service in other ways. And one should never lose sight of their fine ex-

ample of devotion to duty without regard to the wages they receive. In these days, when fortunes are paid in salaries, it is a relief to know that such men as Grant or Sherman did their great work without complaint at the meagre pay which they received. It is a lesson which the world will yet make use of — that the value of service should not be and need not be measured by dollars and cents.

But while all these things are true, they constitute no defence of militarism in itself. Valuable as these incidental outgrowths of military systems may be, they are in no sense the exclusive attributes of such systems. Far greater results would follow if the energy devoted to scientific and inventive work in the services were directed to ends of common utility. Roads and other public works should be, and hereafter will be, designed and built, not for strategic purposes, but for the direct benefit of the people. Organization and discipline on a truly military scale already find application in the great industrial, commercial, and political organizations of the world. Even in the case of compulsory military service the civil and indus-

trial advantages resulting therefrom are not the outgrowth of militarism. If the same amount of service were required, with the exclusively military features replaced by others in the line of industrial training, the beneficial influence upon the public welfare would be even more marked than under the existing system. It is true that as yet nothing but the primary purpose of national defence has been found that will furnish governments with the arbitrary power necessary to enforce this service. Still it is conceivable that, in compulsory or voluntary form, it will yet become established in all progressive nations as a part of the better education of the people.

IV—RELIGION, ART, AND LITERATURE

The militarist in his zeal goes so far as to trace the origin of armed strife to the religious nature of man, holding that war in its symbolic, if not literal, sense is a natural condition of human society. Its imagery everywhere abounds in religious literature. Christ's church is the Church Militant, engaged in perpetual warfare with the

powers of darkness. "I have fought the good fight," was Paul's summary of his career as an evangelist. "Watch and fight and pray" is the opening exhortation of a sacred hymn which has stirred the religious fervor of millions of hearts. The "armor and breast-plate of righteousness" and the "helmet of salvation" protect man in his never-ceasing struggle with the legions of sin; and to him who perseveres in this struggle, "victory"—brightest word in the lexicon of war—is the promised reward.*

We may admit that the right and duty to resist and overcome evil are fundamental. It is clear that Christ did not teach a contrary doctrine nor forbid all use of physical force to that end. He is indeed the Prince of Peace and his benediction

* This spiritual side of war has recently found iconographic expression in a magnificent memorial window in the new cadet chapel at West Point. Erected by the alumni of the Military Academy in honor of their departed brethren, this really remarkable work is an effort to portray, through biblical scenes and characters, the genius of West Point, not merely as a technical school for the training of military officers, but in its broader symbolism of the warfare of life.

rests upon peacemakers. The Golden Rule and the principle of returning good for evil are the foundations of His system, and are the only rules of individual conduct which possess perennial vitality superior to every test. But He taught by His example—as when He expelled the money-changers from the Temple—that circumstances may require the use of physical force. Perhaps the true spirit of His teaching in this respect is best summarized by St. Paul in the passage—“For as much as lieth in you live peaceably with all men.” This injunction is the moral sanction of war. Every honorable effort should be made to avert war and it should be accepted only as a last resort. The question is not that of the use of force in itself so much as of the rightfulness of its use. The common evil of the war method lies in resorting to force before the question of right is determined and upon the arbitrary initiative of one of the disputants. Such use of force finds no sanction in the teachings of Christ.

It is important in this matter to avoid the error of confounding the symbolic with the real. Strife

will indeed prevail in this world so long as there remains a wrong to be righted, and the word "fight," in its figurative sense, will always be one of the most used words in any language. In politics, in law, in business, even in science men are perpetually "fighting." But such strife differs in principle fundamentally from actual war. As a rule, there is present an impartial arbiter. The struggle is only a rivalry between the two sides of a controversy in their efforts to convince the arbiter. It is really a search after the truth—which war never is. Indeed, as applied to such rivalry, the word fight, in its war meaning, is a solecism. There are, it may be admitted, practices in business life in which every debasing feature of actual war, except wholesale destruction of life and property, finds expression, and the militarist sometimes cites this fact in defence of war. But not until the moral law makes one sin an excuse for another can such a justification have any validity.

Touching the relation of war to art and literature, Ruskin, a friend of peace, says that "all the

pure and noble arts of peace are founded on war"; and the Italian historian, Ferrero, himself an earnest pacifist, has made a similar confession. With all deference to the eminence of these authorities, is it not true that they have accepted a mere coincidence as proof of inherent relationship? Have they not assumed that because art and literature were born among "nations of soldiers" they are, therefore, the natural fruit of militarism? Considering the universality of war in the past these intellectual developments could have arisen in no other circumstances. That they have dealt largely with military subjects is, for the same reason, quite natural. But this historic coincidence is no evidence of any essential relation between the two, unless it be that the intellectual capacity necessary to produce high artistic development in a people may also produce fine military prowess. The fact that the world's greatest artists, though living in an atmosphere of war, have produced their best work upon subjects disconnected with war, shows that militarism was not essential to the development of their genius.

In this connection reference may be made to the high value of the better class of war literature, particularly of war poetry. There is a lofty inspiration about it, drawn from the fierce storm and peril of battle, the mighty interests at stake, the deeds of heroism, and the grandeur and glory of military exploits, which stirs the heart to its profoundest depths. One constantly forgets, however, how much of this originates with the pen itself. The poet idealizes, and from his skilful hand the base, the mean and the repulsive come forth clothed in innocence, purity, and beauty. It is a happy fact — one that comforts with the assurance that the passing of war does not mean the passing of the art which has so ennobled the history of war.

Unfortunately, the great mass of war literature is not of a character to which this commendation can be applied. Its fascination for the average mind springs from quite different considerations. The noise and pomp and circumstance of war, like the clang of a fireman's bell, have a resistless attraction and a great portion of war literature is

a catering to this lower taste. Cruelty, bloodshed, suffering, death, are the morbid lure which popularizes cheap war literature and corrupts rather than elevates the mind. The annals of peace are tiresome, yet the nation whose annals are of that character is happy, Montesquieu assures us. Naturally such annals make poor literature for lovers of excitement and the writer who is looking for themes that are not tiresome will look rather to those unhappy nations which are torn by the distractions of war.

Indirectly related to this subject is a benefit of militarism which is generally ignored for the poor reason that sentimental considerations are rarely deemed worthy to stand alongside those of utility. This is the contribution to the pleasure of people the world over which the army and navy afford. It is only when one considers the wonderfully interesting character of great works like battleships, fortifications and other paraphernalia of war, the manœuvres of bodies of troops, the music, uniform, and outward attractions of everything military and their deep hold upon the

popular taste in all ages and countries, that a full realization of the importance of this feature can be understood. Considered as a pageant only, no event in history ever delighted so many people, or drew forth so much voluntary expenditure to witness it, as the voyage of our battleship fleet around the world. This matter was incidentally alluded to in a recent debate on the Naval bill in Congress in which a distinguished Senator compared the economic waste of battleship expenditure with that of building the Pyramids of Egypt, but held that the advantage was on the side of the Pyramids because they "remain a delight to the eye," etc. Yet it is safe to say that military and naval establishments are a source of interest and pleasure to more people in a single year than are the Pyramids of Egypt in a century. What possible comparison, from this point of view, can there be between those cold, inert masses of rock, monuments to ages of unrequited slavery, and a modern dreadnought, the most perfect product in material development which the civilization of the ages has brought

forth? But no one, of course, would contend that these considerations alone are any justification for the maintenance of military establishments.

V—JUSTICE AND PATRIOTISM

One of the sanctions of war which the militarist puts forward as something not to be questioned is that it has often been the only means of securing justice, or conversely, of resisting injustice. And yet the war method of settling disputes is the very antithesis of fair dealing. Nothing can be further from the ideals of justice than to allow contestants individually to pass upon the merits of their controversy and to appeal to arms if their demands are not acceded to. Such appeals do not settle disputes on the basis of justice at all. They decide "not who is right but only who is strong." They are like the *code duello* under which two men agree to carry their dispute to the so-called "field of honor." The skilfulest man wins, right or wrong. If justice win, it is by accident. So in war, the righteousness of a cause,

though an aid, is no sure guaranty of success. Providence (*alias* success) is on the side of the heaviest battalions. Victory, often as not, means the reversal of justice, and war to that extent is an instrument of injustice. As a means of settling international disputes it is at best a necessary evil and its use is justifiable only to the extent that a better substitute has not been found. The time will come when the world will marvel that it should so long have chosen to travel so rough a road, just as it now wonders at its former universal belief in slavery and other barbarous institutions. That a cannon, a submarine mine, or a torpedo boat should have any part in the administration of international justice will yet appear quite as preposterous as now appears the discarded use of instruments of torture in promoting the true interests of Church or State.

The word patriotism suggests primarily, though superficially, the duty of defending one's country against its enemies. In its true signification it is a broader and higher sentiment than that. Love of country — fatherland — like love of home, is

an attachment which springs from long association and ties of kindred, intensified by common interests and common dangers. It is simple loyalty and devotion to that section of the human family with which one's lot is cast. It is a sentiment so deep and universal that it must be considered a fixture in the human mind, present with every one who has not "a soul so dead" that the passion of love is extinct in it. Thus considered, patriotism is a pure and noble sentiment, an expression of that unity of interest which is necessary for the successful organization of men on any scale or for any purpose. Unfortunately, the universality of war in the past and the constant peril of attack has made armed defence practically the only concrete expression of this sentiment, and in the popular mind the word is inseparably bound up with the idea of militarism.

It is this fortuitous environment which sometimes gives the word degrading associations. The sacred halo which surrounds it covers up much that is unworthy and even un-Christian. So true is this that one might almost say, paraphrasing

Madame Rolland's famous words, Oh Patriotism, what crimes have been committed in thy name ! When patriotism degenerates into jingoism and masquerades in the garb of "my country, right or wrong," when it fosters hatred of fellowmen who are born under another flag, when it becomes the hypocritical weapon of ambitious and designing men, and in its name life, liberty and property are sacrificed in useless strife, it is no longer a noble sentiment, but a narrow and ignoble one. The baneful heritage of ages of this false patriotism is seen in national and racial hatreds which still survive in such anachronisms as "natural enemies," "hereditary foes," and the like. Hereditary foes ! Think of it — whole nations hating one another for no better reason than that their fathers hated and fought and wronged one another. It is like those senseless family feuds, now happily rare, in certain remote sections of our own country, in which men fight and kill each other because their fathers quarrelled over forgotten acts in a by-gone generation. The greatest need of world-wide edu-

cation to-day is to make men realize the inherent folly and wickedness of such an attitude.

A true patriotism must be broad enough to accord to other nations what it claims for its own. In proportion as the sentiment of universal brotherhood obtains dominion in the thoughts of men, the word patriotism will be shorn of its narrow, provincial associations and it will become what it should be—love of native land, not lacking in generous rivalry in the race of progress, but full of recognition of the unity and equality of all mankind. Under this higher meaning men may still serve, honor, or even die for their country, but they will cease to condone its faults or to call that right which in another country they would call wrong.

An expression of patriotism which easily degenerates into mere formalism is the undue prominence given to its chief symbol. Too often men make a fetish of the flag, forgetting that it is a symbol only and that all the demonstration in the world cannot make it the reality for which it stands. Let there be a flag over every school

house, but do not teach children that that is the substance of patriotism. Let the trained military officer, whenever he passes the flag, lift his cap, as he has been taught; but if his civilian brother omits this act through a feeling that it is a Pharisaical praying at street corners to be seen of men instead of the deeper closet worship of his own mind, let him not be esteemed less patriotic on that account.

It is perhaps the undue influence of symbols and the narrower forms of expression that makes patriotism, in its ordinary manifestations of all things, superficial—mere love of excitement, demagogic fervor, with nothing profound or fundamental about it. Popular enthusiasm at the outbreak of war may fill the needed battalions over and over; but the quality of this enthusiasm becomes known after the war has progressed for a time, particularly if not wholly successful. Witness our own great war which, more than almost any other in history, should have relied upon the patriotism of the people. Yet it soon became necessary to resort to drastic measures to force men into the service. "Bounty-jumping," the draft

and other methods of coercion and subsidy are incidents in the history of that struggle which we would gladly expunge from the record. Patriotism should not be confounded with love of excitement nor with the vainglory of demagogism.

It may be urged that reluctance to serve, as in the example cited, is not altogether due to lack of patriotism, but to conscientious doubt as to the justice of a cause or to disbelief on principle in the war method of settling disputes. Tolstoi, as is well known, openly justifies refusal to serve under such conditions. It is a delicate question involving as it does the right of government over the consciences of its citizens. But practical necessity resolves the doubt in favor of government while at the same time imposing upon it a moral responsibility which it should consider well before it takes the irrevocable step of war. In the very nature of things government must be obeyed. Government were impossible upon any other basis. And so, in any but a case so flagrant as to justify revolution, the citizen's duty is to obey his country's call and subordinate his own opinion to that

of his government. Doing this is a self-sacrifice which is one of the finest qualities of patriotism. And the exaction of this duty from its citizens places upon government a high obligation, namely, that it shall not take up arms unless its cause be so clear that it may reasonably satisfy the conscience of its people.

VI—THE WAR VIRTUES

That the military profession should esteem itself the highest exponent of the virtues of courage, heroism, self-sacrifice and devotion to duty is quite natural, but it is not so easy to account for the wide prevalence of the same view outside of that profession. It seems to be taken for granted that the heroism of war is of a finer quality than that of peace or it would not appeal so much more strongly to the imagination. Only recently a religious journal, naturally an advocate of peace, presented this popular distinction very effectively. It said: "The sacrifices of war are not altogether wasted. They may be the price cheerfully and heroically paid for freedom.

Terrible as is war, it may leave a heritage of heroes which enriches all later generations. But what compensation have the horrors of peace? Those slain in them do not die for country; they do not lengthen the nation's roll of heroes; thought of them does not quicken the blood with patriotic zeal."

Quite too common is this warped conception of what constitutes true courage or heroism. In nine cases out of ten there is nothing more to the man's credit who dies on the battlefield than to his who dies in the performance of duty in any walk of life. What makes men go into battle? Mere personal courage or patriotic fervor seldom. They must obey orders under severe penalties; their pride helps them for they hate to be called cowards; and when the strife is on fear vanishes in the excitement and wild passion of the moment. Men dying thus have no special claim to virtue. Each passing day calls forth, in the line of common duty, acts of true heroism — in shipwreck or train-wreck, in flood or fire or storm, in mine or in earthquake — which entitle the actors to recognition as

high and lasting as that accorded to the noblest deeds of war. It is a perversion of justice to hold in light esteem, as the world commonly does, the humble heroes of daily life and laud to the skies the heroes of camp and battlefield. There is perhaps some justification of this distinction in the fact that men go into battle with a full knowledge of its dangers beforehand and therefore in an attitude of voluntary self-sacrifice, whereas the perils of ordinary life come, as a rule, unexpectedly and men become involved in them by force of unforeseen circumstances and not of their own free will. But this exception is valid only so far as men accept the dangers of war voluntarily and not under compulsion or as a matter of business—a reservation which excludes the vast majority. On the other hand, voluntary self-sacrifice is in almost daily evidence in the perils of civil life.

Those who have reflected upon the psychology of war know that one of the greatest problems of commanders of armies in all nations and ages has been that of bracing their men up to the point

of courage necessary to go into battle. The devices resorted to for this purpose, from the exhortations of priests to the downright use of intoxicants, have been many and ingenious and show how empty is the pretence that the average soldier goes into battle on the strength of mere personal courage. "Contempt" of life, of which one hears so much, is a phenomenon rarely met with and little to be commended. No man has a right to value his life lightly. A normal and healthy nature always experiences fear in the presence of danger. It is the instinct of self-preservation, the most natural instinct of human nature. The condemnation which may properly be called cowardice comes not from an honorable solicitude for life, but from permitting personal safety to override the positive obligations of duty. True courage is such an intelligent exercise of the will power as will subordinate this natural sense of fear to the higher sense of duty. It is a most interesting and welcome fact that the higher the intelligence and morality of troops the more potent is this ideal of courage. The worse the

man the better the soldier may have been true of the past but it is not true of the citizen soldiery of to-day.

Modern conditions of warfare, moreover, make very different demands upon the personal courage of soldiers and produce very different psychological effects from the wars of ancient or even of comparatively recent times. Then the soldier came face to face with his antagonist; now, for the most part, he fights an invisible foe. Then hand to hand conflicts aroused all the savagery and bestial passions of the heart. Now men kill and maim and are killed and maimed in turn without any knowledge of who it is that deals the blow. The passion of personal combat is much less aroused and the character of battle is elevated. In a modern seacoast fort, the gunners are not in the old sense fighters at all but merely well-trained actors for carrying out a programme determined long before—in the brain of the student, in laboratory and shop, in toilsome studies and experiments of the figure of the earth, the strength of explosives, the resistance of

steel, and the trail of projectiles through the air. They may not even see the object at which they are firing. They are scientific experts working under cover with almost perfect security from danger. While the same rule holds to a limited degree in the field, a new order of courage and self-reliance has been developed there. The great range and accuracy of field artillery and small arms make close formation in battle impracticable. The open order now necessary diminishes the radius of an officer's personal influence on the field and throws greater responsibility upon subordinates and even upon enlisted men. The soldier thus becomes less an automaton and more an individual force than formerly, and intelligence supplants in an increasing degree blind obedience to orders. Thus civilization and progress temper warfare in other ways than by international agreements, and as war slowly disappears so it becomes inherently less savage and cruel.

The reference in the quotation made a little way back to the "heritage of heroes which en-

riches all later generations" suggests another popular belief in the elevating influence of war upon human character which it is worth while to consider. A similar expression of view to that quoted was recently made by an eminent philosopher, the late Professor William James, in a monograph entitled, "The Moral Equivalent of War." He says of our great Civil War: "Those ancestors, those efforts, those memories and legends, are the most ideal part of what we now own together, a sacred spiritual possession worth more than all the blood poured out." In a similar vein, a member of Congress recently said of the War with Spain that it had given us Manila and Santiago. There is a subtle trait of human nature in all this which it is difficult to account for. It amounts to saying that war is worth while simply for its record of heroic deeds. The idea will not bear examination. Can it be that any of our wars has taught us more than we already knew of right and wrong, of faith and duty and all that makes men or nations what they ought to be? Is it possible that to-day we should be an inferior people

to what we are if that great question of the Civil War had been settled on a peaceful basis, and if the loss of life and treasure and the hatreds and bitterness which divided our people for a generation, and still divide them, had been avoided? Are we really losers by our escape from war over the Alabama claims, the Venezuela incident, or the San Francisco controversy? Is our condition compared with that of France, for example, to be deplored because we have not a "heritage" of military deeds and heroes as grand as hers? The whole idea is irrational. The deeds of war are simply deeds of duty and are worth no more nor less than deeds of duty done in times of peace. Often, indeed, the latter furnish the keener test.

Professor James, in the admirable essay just quoted from, assumes, as the basis of his argument, that military, as compared with civil, life is of a more strenuous and exacting character. He agrees with the militarist that the tendency of war is to develop a more virile manhood than in civil life and he admits that if war were to be abolished the world would lose a positive force in character

building. His "moral equivalent" for this is compulsory service in civil life by which young manhood shall be compelled to serve an apprenticeship in the rugged work of the world and to receive some of its hard knocks; thereby acquiring something of the strenuous experience which he assumes to be one of the chief virtues of military life.

But is it quite certain that Professor James's premises are correct? Is the soldier's life of a more strenuous character than that of his civilian brother? Does it inure him to greater hardship, toil, or personal risk? Probably the enlisted man himself would give a negative answer. In peace service, which to-day constitutes nine-tenths of a soldier's duty, he certainly has an easier time of it than the average mechanic or laborer. Even in war time, leaving out the great crises of battle, that portion of his experience which really taxes his endurance—exposure, forced marches, irregular food supply at times, prison, bivouac and the like—is not of a character that necessarily promotes either moral or physical development. It

may even have the contrary effect. It would certainly form no part of Professor James's system. It is clearly a misconception to suppose that a military life is one of greater strenuosity than civil life. The reverse is more probably true. The real virtue of militarism in this respect is the rigid discipline, obedience and regularity of habit which it enforces.

Akin to this sentiment is a tendency among militarists to regard the pursuit of material well-being as something sordid and base and unworthy of the higher aspirations. Commercialism and industrialism are the ambition of common minds; militarism that of genius. The full dinner pail is an object of contempt ; the sword or the rifle an object of honor. The lot of the laborer is looked down upon; that of the soldier is looked up to. The commercial strategist is in no sense to be compared with the military strategist in his claim to the esteem of his fellowmen.

Yet this whole idea is fallacious and finds no justification in human experience. Material well-being is the first stepping-stone to moral and spir-

itual well-being. Precisely as society has advanced in material welfare, so it has advanced in other directions. A starved and exhausted body means a starved and depraved nature. To destroy the spirit of a people, to crush out their manhood so as to make even political revolution impossible, hold them in grinding poverty like the peasantry of Russia. On the other hand, to stimulate their ambition, to elevate their conception of life, and to arouse that discontent which is the moving force of progress, give them a reasonable taste of the material comforts of life. A recognition of this general truth accounts for and justifies the fact that the primary aim of all practical statesmanship is promotion of the material well-being of the people.

Still it cannot be denied that a large section of society in all countries believes in the vitality of militarism as an element in national life, and considers a wholly peaceful disposition synonymous with effeminacy, if not with senility and decay. Recently a Scotchman of high distinction, deploring the alleged lapse of military spirit among his

countrymen, said: "Where are the mountaineers of the hills and glens? Lost in the slums of Glasgow! Where is the granddaughter of sweet Highland Mary? A slave in a machine-worked mill! We are losing our manhood and womanhood," and much more of the same tenor. So in general, the militarist believes that "eternal vigilance" — another term, in his estimation, for the unremitting activity of the military profession — is the price of liberty, and not of liberty only but of those high moral virtues of courage, chivalry and manliness which go to make a nation great. Whether actual war comes or not, the constant preparation for it and the stimulus of military service help to offset the levelling tendencies of industrialism and commercialism and the danger of lethargy and stagnation in national life. Therefore, foster a militant, but not a bellicose, spirit. Ever in peace keep keen the "fighting edge."

The chief defect of the militarist view of this subject is that its premises are in the main fictitious. Those who entertain it are really more

culpable in their way than the peace sentimentalists who so excite their contempt, for they seem quite unconscious of the self-condemnation which such an attitude implies. Does the quest of material well-being belittle *their* character? Has the author above quoted lost *his* manhood from living in an age of machinery! If not, then who? As a matter of fact, genuine patriotism and true military spirit are as strong in the most peaceful nations as in the most warlike, and at the present time as in times past. The men of the city, of the shop or the railroad have proven themselves over and over to be as good (and often better) soldiers as those from the farm and forest. The children of the Scottish clansmen, even if in the machine shop, are rendering the world as great a service as their fathers did, and when their country stands in need will defend it as valorously and as skillfully. These pessimists mistake the pomp of military life for patriotism and cannot understand how there can be devotion to one's country unless accompanied by a blare of trumpets. They fail to see that a higher courage, a more unremitting

vigilance, are required to place righteousness upon the throne of public life than have ever been required to defend against external enemies. It is not essential that men should march in armies or sail in armored ships that their nation may be great. Such a theory is an inversion of the true principles of national greatness. A nation to be great must be guided by higher ideals than those of militarism. If it be inherently weak, military power cannot make it strong, as history proves only too well. Peace does not destroy the virile spirit nor dull the "fighting edge" nor sap the vitality of a people. If, unhappily, our nation or Canada or Australia, or New Zealand or South Africa, is ever called to arms, the spirit of patriotism will be found just as strong, if the cause be right, as if these nations lived under the yoke of militarism like the great powers of Europe.

It is indeed difficult to account for this blind fascination of militarism for certain minds; but doubtless it does not arise wholly, or even mainly, from any belief in the inherent right or justice of war in itself. Probably that which appeals most

powerfully to the imagination is the jeopardy of human life in war. Situations of any sort involving great physical peril arrest attention and call forth human sympathy. War, with its battles and other dangers, is the supreme catastrophe to human life excepting only famine and pestilence; and these, unlike war, do not concentrate destruction in brief and appalling moments when the vigor of life is at its best. A battle comes quickly and scatters its harvest of horror like a whirlwind over the land. The grandeur and magnificence of military organization are likewise an irresistible attraction to the popular mind. Nothing but war, or the preparation for it, calls forth the joint effort of an entire nation. In no other situation does iron discipline find such a field for exercise. The manœuvring of armies, the mighty spectacle of battle, in short all the pomp and circumstance of war, appeal to the imagination as nothing else can.

On the other hand, deeds of heroism in civil life pass unnoticed because of their common occur-

rence and the prosaic environment in which they take place. Unlike the exploits of war they are not crowded into a brief space of time accompanied by every adjunct of sensationalism which may arrest attention. They are a part of the routine of ordinary life and are so accepted without any expectation of unusual recognition, such as even the ordinary deeds of war receive.

It will, of course, be understood that this is in no sense an argument against the necessity or high importance of military service so long as the danger of war exists. It is simply a protest against the very general idea that the military profession has any monopoly of the so-called war virtues. Those virtues will not be lost even if the military profession should become extinct, for they are part and parcel of man's higher nature. It is not the virtues but the vices of militarism that will pass with the passing of war. And more than this, it may be said that these nobler qualities must ever find their purest and highest expression in peace ; for in peace they rest more truly upon

their inherent vitality without extraneous stimulus, whereas in war they are too often the creature of wild impulse, which for the moment arouses the soul to a frenzy of virtue.

CHAPTER II
CONDEMNATION OF WAR

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FROM the foregoing it appears that the sanctions of war commonly accepted—even outside the military profession—have no firm foundation to rest upon. Some have lost their former vitality,—others are fictitious or illusory in character. None is of sufficient validity to justify the continued existence of war. Let us now pass from this negative justification of militarism to the vast array of evidence which stands in positive condemnation of it.

I—THE “MORAL DAMAGE” OF WAR

Following the consideration just given to the war virtues the pacifist would naturally wish to begin with a consideration of the vices and moral damage of war; but the subject is too vast and far-reaching to permit of more than the briefest

reference. He might say in passing, however, that the fundamental evil of war, the one that embraces all others, is a moral evil. Its influence is essentially corrupt and debasing. If it calls forth heroic qualities, still more does it call forth the baser nature. Its specific sin is a loosening of that moral restraint which is the slow growth of a peaceful civilization. Man's nature has not changed. Cruelty, revenge, hatred, corruption, and dishonesty lurk in its inner depths held in leash by the reins of enlightened authority. War removes this restraint, bursts open the Pandora box of the baser passions and permits the latent wickedness of the heart to rise to the surface. It plunges nations and men into a saturnalia of crime and abandons them to the worst elements of their nature. It refines cruelty, legalizes crime and makes falsehood and deception praiseworthy, if practised toward an enemy. It mocks at religion by calling upon Deity to aid, at one and the same time, both sides of a controversy. It engenders contempt for peaceful pursuits and a spirit of arrogance in military men toward those en-

gaged in such pursuits. Its evil influence runs on into times of peace for it is inherent in the very nature of military systems. It is universally recognized that the moral atmosphere of camp and barrack life among enlisted men is not elevating, is often positively degrading, though happily a higher tone is apparent now than in former years. The term "soldiering" has come to be synonymous with shirking of duty. Even among officers, the rusting routine of ordinary duty tends to breed idleness and lack of ambition, which naturally lead to gambling, drink, and neglect of moral obligations.

In business life, so far as it falls under the influence of war, corruption is an inevitable result. The fraudulent practices which spring up mushroomlike on the outbreak of a war would be unbelievable if the facts were not so well attested. What does patriotism mean to the contractor who finds in war an opportunity to swindle his government? What care has he if the soldier's shoes go to pieces on the first day's march? In the great rush of preparation, when there is less opportu-

nity for careful inspection and therefore greater need of public honesty, the scoundrelism of human nature rises to the surface and the government is bled on all sides by those whose primary duty is to protect it. Strict honesty in public dealings in times of emergency is far more rare than it is pleasant to admit.

In political life, likewise, war often leads to corruption and low partisan ideals. When the nation's life is at stake and efficient and upright service is absolutely essential, favoritism and influence too often fill important posts with inefficiency and indifference. Always and everywhere it is the scramble to improve for self-profit the passing opportunity. Partisanship in politics, except under the stress of overwhelming emergency, becomes embittered, and this bitterness continues long after the cause has passed. Compare our own political history for the twenty years after the close of the Civil War with that of the next period of twenty years.

Finally, between warring nations or warring sections of a nation embroiled in civil strife, war

engenders bitterness and hatred which run on into the distant future. "Though the winde lye, the sea may work a great whyle." Time is slow in eradicating such deep-seated animosities. Not yet have the fires of revenge toward Germany ceased to burn in the heart of France. Even to-day in our own country, though the ranks of the blue and gray are wearing thin, the bitter heritage of our Civil War has not wholly passed away. The pathway of war is the trail of the serpent, and wherever it passes it is as clearly marked by its moral wreckage as by the material ruin which strews the track of its destroying armies. Great men have always realized this fact. Even great military men have often confessed their loathing of war. Unquestionably the healthier sentiment of the world to-day upon this subject is voiced in the recent utterance of one of its greatest men — "War is a dreadful thing, and unjust war is a crime against humanity."

II — DESTRUCTION OF LIFE IN WAR

Of the direct and tangible evils of war, the destruction of human life will probably be accounted the greatest; although there is often encountered a false sentiment that solicitude for life is an ignoble characteristic. Life is man's most sacred possession. Without it he is nothing; without it those dependent upon him, or bound to him by kindred ties, are deprived of that for which there is no substitute. Nature guards it with never-ceasing vigilance, and the instinct of self-preservation is stronger even than that of procreation. Society throughout recorded history has punished the wilful destruction of human life as the greatest of crimes. Yet war, openly and *legally* (so far as man-made laws are concerned), destroys human life, and the extent of this destruction in the past is beyond the power of the imagination to conceive. To say, as some have estimated, that fifteen billion human beings have lost their lives through the agency of war since wars have been recorded, is only to confuse

the mind in an attempt to contemplate so vast a host. It would probably equal in number all the inhabitants of the globe for four centuries back. More definitely we know that since Napoleon began his campaigns no fewer than fourteen million people have died as a result of war.

The militarist might here protest that the significance of these figures is not at all proportionate to their magnitude. These same people would all have died if there had been no war. The postponement of that event would have been brief in any case. Who can say that the attendant suffering, when death comes by the short, sharp process of war, is greater than that which accompanies the natural process with its lingering disease and foreknowledge of a doom that cannot be averted. And whether the world has gained or lost by this destruction depends upon its results. There is, of course, no fixed measure of value of human life by which it can be said that a definite result justifies a definite sacrifice; but there have been many wars whose results are approved by history as having fully justified the sacrifices made to secure

them. From the beginning men have been taught the duty of this sacrifice, and the true patriot holds the saving of his life in contempt when it is required for the welfare of his country.

To which it may be replied that it is impossible to make a rational comparison of the suffering from loss of life in war with that in peace. The situations are totally different. Death in the one case ordinarily comes in the midst of friends with such solacement as love and kindness can bestow; in the other it comes in the depths of bestial strife, in noisome camp or foul prison, in the absence of all that the heart craves in the hour of its extremity. The sacrifice of life in war involves every detail of cruelty, misery, and suffering that the mind of man can conceive. It is needless to depict its oft described horrors. No description, no portrayal can do justice to the reality—a reality so terrible that even the great masters of war have been loudest in its denunciation. We may pass over those highly realistic pictures drawn by Hugo and Tolstoi and Von Suttner. Read the humble journals of actual experience, like En-

gineer La Baume's diary of the retreat from Moscow. A whole lifetime of anguish and horror is crowded into experiences such as these.

And referring again to the phrase "contempt of life," it finds, unhappily, an altogether too literal application in the pages of the world's history. It has been a contempt for the life of others, rather than of their own, which has often brutalized the characters of kings and councillors and even of great warriors in their "high chess game whereof the pawns are men"; and sometimes it has found expression in callous candor at which human nature may well shudder. One may condone the outburst of Frederick the Great—"Dogs, would you live forever?"—as being justified by the exigencies of the occasion and not expressive of his true regard for his men; but the brutal sentiments which more than once fell from Napoleon's lips must bear the condemnation of posterity to the latest generation. Referring to those youthful soldiers forced from the homes of France, of whom Metternich said: "Sire, I have seen your soldiers; they are children";

Napoleon is said to have remarked that they would stop bullets as well as others. And again he said : "Let them die with arms in their hands. Their death is glorious and it will be avenged." A lofty satisfaction it must have been to those victims of a ruthless military regime who tramped over Europe in Napoleon's campaigns, dying in march or bivouac or on fields of battle, and generally for ends that can never be justified in history—a lofty satisfaction indeed to be told that such a fate was glorious and that it would be avenged ! Nothing more truly denotes the moral advance of the world-conscience in the century past than the utter abhorrence with which it to-day regards sentiments like these.

It has been much the fashion of late among militarists in our own country to compare loss of life in war with that from violent causes in peace and to claim that the advantage of the record is all on the side of war. Sheer carelessness, they assert, costs more lives than war. The death roll of our railways, mines, ships and other occupations, much of it preventable, makes the death roll of war look

insignificant in comparison. The same is true of deaths from preventable disease. It is a pity that some of the sentiment which is expended upon the destructiveness of war and the means of its prevention is not directed to important subjects that affect us more nearly.

But this much-used comparison is both inaccurate and irrelevant. The losses from accident in peaceful occupations are far less than those of war compared with the number and the length of time engaged. One can readily understand this by imagining war to be continuous, as peaceful occupations are continuous. It seems clear from the statistics of certain great wars that one in ten to one in fifteen annually of those engaged meet death as a direct or indirect result of such service. Losses in peaceful occupations are but a small fraction of this. Happily wars are not continuous, are now even exceptional, and the losses caused by them spread over the whole period of time are indeed small compared with those from violent causes in time of peace.

But the argument itself is irrelevant. It is as if a railway company should seek to justify excessive destruction of life in its service because certain mining operations which it might cite cause greater destruction. Accident and disease should of course be prevented so far as human foresight or skill can prevent them, but whether prevented or not they are no justification of the destruction caused by war. Moreover, the distinction between accident or disease and war as a cause of mortality is fundamental and places the two in quite different categories. Accidents, avoidable or unavoidable, are *unforeseen*. There is no plan or purpose, or deliberate intention to place life in jeopardy. But when 200,000 men on a side are marched against each other with cannon, rifle, and sabre, those who direct such movements know that within a few hours one-fifth of their number will be lifeless on the field or groaning under the surgeon's care. Deaths from the one cause are unintentional and unforeseen; those from the other are intentional or foreseen and therefore homicidal. The two bear no com-

parison to each other, so far as justifying loss of life in war is concerned.

An economic or practical aspect of this subject of the destruction of life in war is that of the material losses resulting from the waste of so much human energy. Taking the estimate of fourteen million deaths caused by war in the past century and assuming that the average shortening of life has been ten years, the world has been deprived of effective labor, mental or physical, equal to one hundred and forty million years of work by one man, and this after it has incurred the initial cost of rearing these men to manhood and preparing them for useful service. With generous allowance for lost work and the work necessary for the individual's own livelihood, the net residuum which might have augmented the world's wealth is enormous. There can be no doubt that the economic progress of the world—the betterment of the general welfare—has been greatly retarded by the immense drain of war upon that portion of the population which does the world's work.

III — DESTRUCTION OF WEALTH IN WAR

Great as is the evil of the loss of life in war, there are others which may almost claim precedence. Next to the possession of life is that which life produces, which in turn is necessary to sustain life—the fruit of human toil—wealth or property in whatever form. War is the arch-devourer of wealth. So vast is the cost of war that only approximate estimates are possible, and these, by their very magnitude, are beyond ordinary mental grasp. It has been estimated that the direct cash outlay in actual war since the close of the French Revolution is not less than forty billion dollars. It would require omniscience itself to marshal the data for the cost arising from the destruction of property, the derangement of business, the interruption of commerce, the depreciation of values, the taking of men from productive employment; but statisticians consider that these additional, though indeterminate, sources of loss would bring the total up to one hundred billion dollars.

These figures relate only to direct results of actual war. Growing out of war are other outlays which run on into the indefinite future. The institution of the national debt, as it exists in the leading nations of the world to-day, is almost wholly a war institution. In fact, without this device modern warfare would be impossible. If nations had to settle their war bills as they come along, and out of their own revenues, they simply would have to avoid incurring the bills. But by the expedient of the national debt they can go to war and compel posterity to pay the expense. It is a huge injustice, but one from which no avenue of escape as yet presents itself. The total national indebtedness of the world to-day is upward of thirty-five billion dollars, and the annual interest charge, which must be paid as it arises, is probably a billion and a quarter dollars. To this enormous annual tax growing out of past wars must be added the pension and charity rolls of all sorts which certainly equal the interest charge just given.

Reference has so far been made only to actual war and its results. Even more burdensome in these later years is the cost of armed peace or preparation for war. Very few adequately realize its enormous magnitude and the rapidity of its increase. At the present time it is in excess of two billion dollars annually, including all nations. For the year 1910 the expenditures for army and navy and for interest on the public debt amounted approximately to \$11.00 per capita in Great Britain; \$12.00 in France; \$7.50 in Germany*; and \$3.30 in the United States. Adding pensions

* It is difficult to obtain accurate comparative figures on account of the lack of a basis of comparison equally applicable to all nations. Germany is a case in point. Owing to the division of debt and budget between the Empire and the States on a basis not clearly defined by the statistical authorities, one can never feel certain as to what the actual cost of the German military establishment is. The figure above given is based upon Col. Gadke's estimate ("McClure's" for November, 1910) adding thereto the interest on the combined debt.

It is manifest that budgets are not an accurate criterion either for comparative measurement of burdens or for the results which the budgets will accomplish, on account of differences in per capita national wealth and in wages and prices.

in the United States brings the figure up to \$5.10, which is substantially the running cost from past wars and for armed peace in our own country. These military expenditures amount to about 60 per cent of the total disbursements in Great Britain ; 62 per cent in Germany ; 60 per cent in France; and 38 per cent in the United States. Pensions in the latter country bring the figure up to 64 per cent.

The increase in this outlay is now more rapid than ever before, with every indication of becoming more rapid still in the future.* The discovery of new improvements in war materials leads to constant change and the abandonment of old material, whether small arms or dreadnoughts, long before its efficiency, as measured by the

* The following table shows the approximate percentage of increase in military expenditures during the period, 1890-1910, and illustrates the tremendous boom in navy building which has taken place during that period:

	GREAT BRITAIN	GERMANY	FRANCE	UNITED STATES
Army	60	12	50	261
Navy	161	500	86	425
Army and Navy..	107	57	60	332

standard when built, becomes seriously impaired. A few years ago a fine battleship cost about five million dollars ; now it requires ten to fifteen millions to build one, and a million to a million and a half a year to operate and maintain it. Its total cost at the end of ten years will be twenty to thirty millions and then it may be consigned to the scrap heap or have to be "modernized" at heavy additional outlay.* Moreover, every advance in cost in one direction entails new collateral expenditures. The cost of increased size in battleships is not confined to the ships themselves. More collier capacity and larger drydocks and even deeper ports and channels may be required. Fi-

* The rapidity of increase in size of battleships is certainly something amazing. The first of those larger ships called dreadnoughts was built only about five years ago. Its displacement was about 18,000 tons. This has been followed by vessels of 20,000 and 26,000 tons and now it is reported that one has been ordered by Brazil with a displacement of 32,000 tons. Its cost (in this country, at least) would come close to \$18,000,000. Thus, in displacement and cost, these mighty engines of war have nearly doubled in the space of five years. Cold facts like these may well cause governments to ask where it is all going to end.

nally, there is the entirely new field of aviation in which the expenditure is bound to be large, and which may destroy the value of much of the expenditure already made in the old fields.

Putting all together it is as certain as any future contingency can be, that unless governments take joint action for the limitation of these expenditures, they will go on mounting up in ever increasing ratio. If they increased only as rapidly as population or wealth, the burden might be said not to be increasing. But at the present time they are in most of the great military powers increasing more rapidly, and have become one of the chief causes of anxiety to European statesmen. The budget problem is easily the most serious problem that confronts the governments of the great powers to-day. Basing conclusions upon the records of the past forty years (1870 to 1910) and making such allowance for future increase in cost as past and present experience justifies, it will be a conservative estimate to place the direct and indirect cost of armed peace and of actual war during a future period equal to that since

the Franco-German War at one hundred billion dollars.

A sum like this is so vast as to be almost incomprehensible, but perhaps an idea may be had by comparisons with which most people are familiar. The total railway mileage of the globe is somewhat in excess of 500,000 miles and has cost about forty-three billion dollars, or 43 per cent of the estimated war cost to the next generation. Assuming that the ultimate cost of the Panama Canal will be \$400,000,000, it will still represent only two-fifths of one per cent of this enormous sum. One-half of one per cent of it would be as much as the sum widely advocated in recent years for placing the inland waterways of the United States in first-class condition. In short, there is no public work ever yet undertaken the cost of which is not wholly insignificant compared with this impending outlay on account of militarism.

To this general statement of the case the militarist will interpose certain exceptions and in particular will object to the inference that war expenditures at the present time are more burden-

some than in times past. Much confusion on this and similar subjects results from the absence of a rational standard of comparison. It really means nothing to say that war expenditures constitute fifty, sixty, or seventy per cent of the total expenditures, unless we know what the total expenditures include. These vary greatly in different countries and in the same country at different periods. In the year 1800 the cost of the Army and Navy of the United States was 50 per cent of the total cost of the government. To-day the absolute cost is forty times as great, but it is only 38 per cent of the total expenditures. Moreover, one must consider that the expenditures of the general government in our country are but a small part of the public outlay. If one were to include State expenditures (to say nothing of counties and cities) the percentage would be largely decreased. The only legitimate criterion for comparing the military burdens of different countries, or of different periods in the same country, is the per capita charge considered with the per

capita national wealth.* The burden may increase absolutely from period to period, but if wealth increases more rapidly, the burden is diminishing relatively. In our own country the per capita charge for the Army and Navy in 1800 was only \$1.13 and the per capita wealth was about \$150. In 1909 the military burden had grown to \$3.10 but the wealth had grown to \$1,310. In other words, for every dollar expended in war preparations in the year 1909 there was more than

* Per capita military charge and national wealth, 1910:

	GREAT BRITAIN	GERMANY	FRANCE	UNITED STATES
Army and Navy ..	\$ 7.60	\$ 5.20	\$ 6.24	\$ 3.10
National wealth	1510	725	1125	1310
Comparative burden	1 to 200	1 to 140	1 to 180	1 to 420

In making comparisons like these it would seem that pensions and interest on the public debt should be excluded. These items may, indeed, be legitimately used as a warning against incurring fresh burdens through future wars; but they relate entirely to the past, are liquidated damages, so to speak, and nothing whatever can be done to alter their actual status except as pensioners die or the debt is paid off. If permanent peace were assured to-day these burdens would not be reduced in the least, and they do not therefore fall within the category of those expenditures which admit of reduction through change in public policy.

three times as much wealth to draw from as at the beginning of the last century. Probably a similar proportion would be true of the great powers of Europe. Indeed, evidence of this fact can be seen in every progressive nation in the greatly improved conditions of all classes of society as compared with former times. The drain upon European nations by the wars of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was much greater, in comparison with ability to pay, than has been the case in the past half century.

But while it is true that these burdens are relatively smaller than formerly, this fact is no argument for their continuance after they have become unnecessary. The aim of all true progress should be the continued elimination of evil conditions as fast as they can be reached, and this applies to war budgets as to any other evil. Present day burdens should be measured by present-day necessities and cannot be justified by the fact that they may be less onerous than in former times. Moreover, the rule will not hold if the course of events during the past few years alone

is considered. The increase in war expenditures in very recent times has certainly been greater than the increase in population or the per capita increase in wealth. Taking the years 1890, 1900 and 1909, the per capita wealth of the United States was \$1,040, \$1,160 and \$1,300. The per capita outlay on the Army and Navy for these same years was \$1.06, \$2.50 and \$3.10. The increase of wealth in the first decade was 11.5 per cent and in the second (partial) decade 12 per cent. The increase in military charges for the same periods was 136 per cent and 24 per cent. It is thus seen that at present military burdens are increasing much faster than our ability to pay and the same is true of the great powers of Europe. While these burdens with us have not yet become so great as to be called oppressive, as is the case in some European countries, their rapid increase causes uneasiness and even alarm. It is generally felt to be out of harmony with the advanced enlightenment of the present day and with the rapid development of peaceful methods of settling international disputes.

IV — THE ECONOMIC WASTE OF WAR

To what extent war expenditures are really wasteful in an economic sense has been much discussed and some of the arguments in extenuation of such alleged waste may be noted here.

It will probably be objected by militarists that it is unfair to characterize the bequeathing of war debts and pension charges to posterity as a "huge injustice." If war has produced important results, of which posterity enjoys the continuing benefits, then it is just that posterity should help pay. Such, in fact, is the equitable foundation of all public indebtedness. It is incurred for works which benefit future generations as well as the present and it would not be just to compel the present generation to bear the whole burden. The defect of this argument, however, is that the premise upon which it is based is true of comparatively few of the world's wars.

It may also be urged that it is not strictly correct to place in the same class with outlays for actual war and destruction of wealth caused directly

by war the later expenditures for pensions and for interest on the war debt. The wealth spent or destroyed in war is lost absolutely — gone up in smoke — in an economic sense. But money paid out in pensions or interest is not lost; it is simply transferred from certain holders to others. It is still available wealth and will enter the avenues of trade and industry in some capacity or other. A system which takes from Peter and gives to Paul may not be a wise one in itself, but the wealth so transferred is not lost.

The question is not without its difficulties and may have different answers according to the point of view. If the original expenditure of money and human energy for which these present-day payments are being made had been to some useful end (economically considered) and not wholly destructive, its continuing returns might have offset in part or entirely these later charges and have been a substantial gain to the wealth of the world. But taking the expenditures as they now stand without regard to their original purpose, a somewhat different conclusion results. Nearly all

government money is drawn from the people through taxation. Some is expended productively, as in rearing forests, irrigating lands, improving waterways, etc., and, if judiciously spent, presumably yields an economically useful return. Other money is spent in battleships and other material of war and this yields a definite and positive return, but one of no economic value. Pensions and interest yield no return whatever to the government (the investing party) and thus considered are the most wasteful expenditures of all. But viewed as a redistribution of a certain portion of the public wealth, the money so paid, particularly in pensions, yields much real good to the beneficiaries. It is as free for investment as it was before with the exception of the necessary wastage in redistribution and that bestowed upon mere personal comfort; and it is therefore a more useful expenditure to the people at large, though less useful to the government direct, than expenditures on forts and battleships.

Another economic evil which is really a form of pension, is the statutory requirement by the gen-

eral government and those of most of the States that the survivors of our wars shall be given precedence in public employment. This results in inefficiency in public work and has cost millions and millions of dollars. There is something pathetic in the fact that a G. A. R. badge, which in itself is a badge of high honor, should become one of the most hateful of insignia to officials charged with the execution of important public work.

It may be asked if these criticisms do not apply equally to old age pensions now coming so generally into vogue with hearty approval of the public conscience. There is a material difference. The old age pensioner has given to society the abilities and energies of a lifetime, and goes on the pension roll only after nature in its ordinary course has made him no longer useful to the State. In the case of the war pensioner, his usefulness is destroyed or impaired in the very prime of life when it is at a maximum, and he is made a dependent many years before he would be in regular course. The State is thus deprived of his services for a longer period than it should be, and is put

to expense on his account for the whole of this increased period. The result is therefore wasteful in the extreme and can be justified, from an economic standpoint, only on the assumption (so frequently incorrect) that the war itself produces economic advantages which offset the sacrifice.

It is sometimes urged that an important benefit results from the periodic distribution of so much pension and interest money, particularly the pensions, even if it is taking from Peter to give to Paul. The quarterly payment of say forty million dollars in small sums to beneficiaries scattered throughout the length and breadth of the land is an aid in making money "easier" and has no doubt often afforded some relief from financial stringency. But whatever merit there may be in the argument, it is no justification of pensions on their own account. If the same money were paid out monthly or oftener in economically useful expenditures, the advantage of a periodic distribution of funds would result in even greater measure and there would be in addition a productive return of positive value.

It will, of course, be understood that the foregoing criticisms upon the economic value of pension expenditures do not affect the moral obligation of the State to pay pensions to its disabled soldiers. The soldier subjects his own will to that of his government when war comes. The government assumes full responsibility when it exacts his services. He is therefore entitled to consideration for disability incurred in its service whether the cause in which he is engaged is a good one or not.

Again the militarist declines to accept without much abatement the proposition that war necessarily results in derangement of business. Rather it often stimulates business and great strides have been taken forward simultaneously with, and presumably as a consequence of, its existence. Witness our own enormous business expansion following the war with Spain; and it is said that Spain herself has enjoyed greater prosperity since that war than for a long period previously. A recent work on the industrial condition of the North during the American Civil War shows quite con-

clusively that the North enjoyed great prosperity throughout that period. It is probably always true that war, by forcing greater activity through the normal channels of trade and by opening up new channels of more or less permanency, stimulates business to an extent which materially offsets its evil effects.

History, far from supporting this argument, refutes it altogether. The examples cited and others like them which might be cited admit of better explanations. The recent industrial and business expansion of the United States had already set in before the war with Spain broke out and was not materially affected by that conflict. So far as Spain has enjoyed increased prosperity since the war, it is not to be attributed to the stimulating effect of war upon her trade or business so much as to her relief from the burden of maintaining the colonies which the war deprived her of. If the North enjoyed business prosperity during the Civil War, it was doubtless not as great as it would have enjoyed without it, while industry, commerce and business of all sorts in the

South were completely paralyzed. Taking the country as a whole the effect of the war was very damaging to trade and industry. But to appreciate the real influence of war in this respect, consult the history of those long continued wars in Europe which utterly ruined industry, suspended trade and even depopulated prosperous sections of the country. While war may stimulate those lines of business which have to do with military supplies, its effect upon trade and industry as a whole, if long continued, is absolutely destructive. It may be recalled that a few years ago Secretary of War Taft and other high authorities gave, as one of the causes of the world-wide monetary stringency of 1907, the vast destruction of property and absorption of capital by the great wars of the preceding few years.* And this disturbance of business by war becomes more serious as the interdependence of nations financially and com-

* The Massachusetts Commission on the Cost of Living (1910) laid great stress in its report upon the influence of recent wars and war preparation in forcing up prices.

mercially increases. Touch a nerve of trade to-day and the whole body quivers in response.

The usefulness of military expenditures in diminishing the ranks of the unemployed during periods of industrial depression is sometimes urged by the militarist and has indeed been recognized in memorials from business and labor organizations to the government. It is true that if, in periods of depression, armies were to be disbanded they would swell the ranks of the unemployed. It is also true that the recruiting office is a good barometer of prosperity; thriving best when times are dullest. But this affords no justification for military employment as an economic expedient. It would manifestly be better, if the government were going to give employment to a certain number of men at such times, so to employ them that their labor would yield a return of some useful sort. The problem of the unemployed is indeed a grave one. In its very nature it is a social crime that men and women ready and willing to work should be deprived of the opportunity to do so. Sooner or later society must find

a solution for this problem or it will be the undoing of society. But such a solution can never be found in maintaining a percentage of the population in useless employment. If, in time of industrial stress, when the land is full of idle men, the government were to select two hundred thousand of the most able-bodied, pay, clothe, and feed them well, and allow them to lie around in idleness, a mockery to their suffering fellows, the country would rise en masse and put a stop to such action. Yet, in an economic sense, this is precisely what military employment amounts to. Possibly the time will come when public authority, — national, state, or municipal, — will provide employment on public works at such times, no doubt at less than current wages, but enough to bridge over periods of depression, thus making employment yield some useful return to society, and at the same time making it impossible for any able-bodied citizen to say with truth that he has no opportunity to earn his daily bread.

Finally, some public men do not look upon our great naval expenditures as so much economic

waste, since they are nearly all paid out among our own people, providing a market for labor, supplies, etc. Some even consider this advantage in itself sufficient to justify such expenditures, whereas they would oppose them if made in another country, even if much saving in cost could thereby be effected. It is an alluring fallacy and one that has captivated many minds. Admitting its validity for a moment, it does not alter the fact that the *purpose* of the expenditure is wasteful, and that, whatever these alleged advantages may be, they would be just as great if the expenditures were for some useful purpose. There may, indeed, be a local advantage to the people from making these expenditures at home, though the same product might be had at less cost abroad. The point need not be discussed ; it is too deeply rooted in the public mind to be easily disturbed, even if in fact unsound. But it is really not the true justification of this policy at all. It is rather the fact that such a policy makes a nation independent of foreign nations in providing its means of

defence—a fact which might be of decisive importance in the event of war.

All of the foregoing objections are, it appears, irrelevant because they apply equally to both sides of the question; and we may state the general conclusion quite regardless of them; that, notwithstanding the limited economic uses of military expenditures (on roads, scientific research, etc.,) and their contribution to public entertainment and pleasure, the world at large is held back in an economic sense to an extent that few imagine, by devoting so much wealth to purposes economically useless. It is not necessary to assume that if all military expenditures were abolished, equal sums, as our ultra-peace friends are so fond of urging, would at once go into works of utility, like canals, forests, irrigation, schools, reform work and the like. A great deal—particularly that left to the people through reduced taxation—might be devoted to non-productive, yet worthy ends, such as individual comfort and well-being. The primary purpose of all production is promotion of the common welfare and the greater the

surplus of wealth above that required to carry on the work of production, the greater will be the margin of human comfort above the bare necessities of existence. Taxation need not be inimical to this purpose. Whether applied to productive ends, as in any of the great fields of public utility, or in the promotion of comfort, as in public parks, protection of health and the like, if judiciously spent, it is not a burden but a benefit. On the other hand, if applied to non-productive and non-helpful ends, as is mainly the case with military expenditures, it is a dead loss to humanity, justified only by those exigencies in national existence which civilization has not yet removed.

An extremist writer of anti-peace proclivities recently made the statement that military expenditures were not destructive of wealth and that if such expenditures were increased a thousand fold our national wealth would not be diminished a particle. Ignoring the exaggeration that more than twice the total national wealth might be absorbed annually in military expenditures and still leave that wealth as great as it was

before, the fundamental fallacy of the idea which the writer intended to convey may be pointed out. By strict letter the building of a battleship or fort may not diminish wealth, but the real truth is exactly the opposite. If such expenditures do not *destroy* wealth, they convert it into useless and inert forms, equivalent to destruction, and they further produce the same result by preventing the *increase* of wealth. A single example will enforce this point beyond the possibility of refutation. The great Assouan dam on the Nile is said to have cost about the price of a modern battleship and it is estimated that it will add ten times its cost to the taxable wealth of Egypt. The battleship construction destroys no wealth, but it converts a great deal into a form economically useless, and it yields absolutely nothing in the future. The dam is a great productive agent which goes on paying for itself over and over in its improvement of economic conditions. This is the whole case in a nutshell. So far as military expenditures can with safety be diverted to economically useful ends, so far the world's wealth will be in-

creased and the welfare of its inhabitants be promoted. In fact, if the impending expenditure of the next forty years, as heretofore stated, could be directed to non-military channels it would revolutionize the world. It could double the world's railway mileage, purchase and make free to commerce existing ship canals and build all others that are physically practicable, thoroughly improve the navigable condition of rivers and harbors, reclaim all arid and swamp lands capable of reclamation, plant all the forests for which there will be available areas, foster scientific research and invention and carry out works of social, sanitary, and industrial reform such as the most sanguine now scarcely dream of. It is not too much to say that it would mean a change from abject poverty to a degree of comfort to millions and millions of families. Whether ten to fifty dollars is taken from a family's annual income or added to it may seem a small matter, but to a great portion of the world's families it is a large matter.

It is indeed difficult to overestimate the importance of this question. In our own country we have heard a great deal about conservation in these later years. Though few have any precise idea of what it means, still, like a dreamy something of great promise, it has captivated the public mind until it has become the shibboleth of a great popular movement. Floods of eloquence from rostrum and press have deluged the country with warnings of danger real or fictitious concerning the waste of field and forest and mine. Yet, so far as this waste is subject to control by governmental agency, it does not amount to a tithe of the material and mental waste resulting from war and armed peace. Most of the waste of natural resources arises from carelessness or ignorance and will correct itself naturally as the urgency for correction becomes more manifest. But war waste is the result of deliberate intention. It is not indefinite or imaginary but subject to accurate computation in dollars and cents. It is capable of almost complete prevention. Here,

therefore, is the greatest field for the exercise of true conservation that exists in the world to-day.

Such is the economic question involved; but there is another and very important consideration. The problems of the future are radically different from those of the past. The world is at last approaching a condition where its vacant spaces are rapidly filling up. Migrating hordes will no longer wander over the earth as in times past. The strong chains of authority will confine such wanderings to mere individual movements. The world must provide for its growing population substantially as it is now disposed over the surface of the globe. The problem is vast, many-sided, and difficult. Increased production, conservation of energy and resources, improvement in education and practical training of all kinds, sanitation, care of the aged and infirm, honesty and efficiency in public life—these and kindred measures make up the great problem of the future. It is not how nations may most skilfully claw at one another's throats, but how, by mutual aid, they can best provide for the well-being of the

hordes within their respective borders. For all this, vast resources will be required and at best there will never be enough. This is at bottom the chief reason why nations should curtail as rapidly as possible those outlays which now constitute a vast economic waste and make them available in solving those mighty problems which are becoming more urgent with every passing hour.

CHAPTER III

ARMED PEACE OR PREPARATION FOR WAR

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I — MEANING OF WAR PREPARATION

WE have discussed the economic aspect of expenditures in preparation for war; let us now consider the causes and justification of such expenditures. "In time of peace prepare for war" is one of those popular axioms which, like "All men are created equal," is easy to understand as a glittering generality but not so easy in its specific application. Preparation *for* war — does it mean preparation with the deliberate purpose of making war, as in the case of Japan's exhaustive preparations to strike Russia? Or is it for self-protection only? If one were to rely solely upon the outward profession of governments, *all* war preparation is of a purely defensive character, a necessary protection against possible aggression or intolerable wrong. This was cer-

tainly Washington's understanding as applied to America, and it has been the consistent policy of our government from the beginning. But the vast preparations carried on to-day by certain governments exceed any obvious requirements of defence, and excite doubts as to the sincerity of assurances that they are for no other purpose.

Assuming, however, that the purpose of war preparation *is* generally that of defence, what after all does it really mean? In plain unvarnished terms does it not mean simply keeping ahead of the other fellow? Pursued to its logical outcome does it ordinarily mean increased relative strength at all? Suppose, for example, that there are two nations, equal in population and natural resources, similar in race and material development, what would war preparation mean in their case? Could it mean other than a maintenance of equality of their natural power of offence and defence? If one should step ahead must not the other instantly follow? And if the strife goes on — whether in naval force, standing armies, reserves, permanent fortifications, strategic lines of

transportation, drill, discipline, and patriotic education — until these preparations are carried to the highest possible efficiency, as in Germany to-day, will these nations be relatively any better prepared for war than when they had nothing but naked nature to rely upon? For scientific warfare, yes; but as a trial of strength in a fight to win, no. It all amounts to an effort to keep ahead in a race which has now degenerated to the last degree of madness.

And a corollary of this truth is that preparation means one thing at one time and quite a different thing at another. At the close of the American Civil War, our nation was stronger, compared with other nations, than ever before or since. No other nation could have met us successfully on sea or land. To-day, with that same preparation, we could do nothing. A single modern battleship could sweep our victorious navy from the ocean, and 25,000 men with modern arms could annihilate the seasoned veterans of that four years war, North and South combined. Preparation to-day may be only impotence to-morrow, and

this fact constitutes one of the most hopeless features of the problem.

Consider another aspect of the case. What does preparation mean to a small state like Belgium? Does it indeed mean preparation in any adequate sense at all? Would all her defensive preparation, her fortifications of Antwerp, Namur, and Liege, save her in the least degree in war with a great State like Germany? They would be worse than useless, for they could not prevent, but only delay, ultimate defeat, and her people would be punished (financially) all the more severely as their resistance might cause greater sacrifice to the victors. The Brialmonts of Europe, who look at civilization only through the red spectacles of war, are lame advisors to these small States, leading them to squander vast sums for purposes which must prove futile in any trial of strength between them and their great neighbors.

It is true that the alleged purpose of the preparations just referred to is not so much for defence in actual war with a greater power as to

enforce neutrality should other powers at war attempt to violate it; but in case of such an attempt this distinction would quickly cease to be a difference. It is also held by some that war preparation helps weak nations more than the strong, and thus reduces their natural disparity of strength. It was Carlyle who said, speaking of weapons of defence, that the "genuine use of gunpowder is that it makes all men alike tall." In the same way it may be argued that measures of defence tend to make all nations alike tall, or at least to bring them nearer an equality of resisting power. But the comparison will not hold. The reverse is oftener true. The gunpowder of war preparation is merely a function of national resources, and a great nation can spend so much more lavishly than a small one that the natural disparity of strength, far from being reduced, is augmented.

II—WAR PREPARATION AND PEACE

It is uniformly held by militarists that war preparations operate to keep the peace among na-

tions. In certain instances this contention may be true; ordinarily it is not. Where preparations are of a perfectly general character, as are those of the United States, and not directed against a particular nation, they may be considered as defensive only, tending to prevent aggression without arousing fear or suspicion. But the reverse is true where preparation is, either in fact or belief, aimed at a particular rival. There can be no doubt that the tension between France and Germany is aggravated by the constant piling up of fortifications along the frontier. And if other examples were lacking, the tragic situation of late existing between England and Germany would alone prove that armaments make for war. Here were two great nations, traditional friends, allies on many a battlefield, bound together by commercial ties and royal kinship as no other two nations are, actually talking themselves into war—for if the senseless clamor of a few years ago had kept up, these two peoples would have become so convinced that war was inevitable that it would act-

ually have come. What is the explanation of this remarkable psychic phenomenon? *War preparation alone.* Germany's vast strides in building a navy caused the dwellers across the channel to ask what it was all for. And out of this question arose the firm conviction that it was aimed at England. The peaceful feeling that had prevailed for generations was gone, absolutely, and no one can foresee when it will fully return. No! whatever war preparation may do in the way of protecting a nation or ensuring victory when war comes, it does not, in examples like those cited, prevent, or even tend to prevent, war itself. Its tendency is rather the other way.

In a negative way, our own history furnishes ample proof of this fact. On the Canadian frontier we have an example of practical disarmament on an extensive scale. Nothing in the way of defensive measures, either naval or land, exists along the entire line of more than 3,000 miles. Suppose now that, instead of continuing this policy of peace which has prevailed for nearly a century,

these two countries were to begin defending themselves against each other by preparing for war which the true conscience of both peoples looks upon as an abomination. Suppose that at Niagara Falls, Buffalo, Detroit, and many other places, where intercourse is now (except for absurd tariff barriers) as free as between the States of the Union, great batteries and bridge-heads and depots of supply were to be built and the lakes and other navigable waters were to be filled with war vessels; can any one doubt that such a situation would engender those very fears and jealousies and suspicions that make neighboring States enemies of each other? Canada, with only one-fourteenth the numerical strength of the United States, has no more fear of invasion by her powerful sister than has Ohio of invasion by Pennsylvania. But if these two countries were to assume the attitude toward each other of France and Germany, if the public thought were to be stirred up by the talk of invasion, if military clubs in both countries were to commence discussing problems of offence and defence, all this sense

of peaceful security would vanish and there would be the same feeling of suspicion and unrest which to-day creates such a dangerous tension between England and Germany.

And yet there are plenty of jingoes on both sides of the line who would abandon this blessed policy of peace and force these countries into the attitude of military rivals. One can understand how selfish motives may lead contractors and even cities along the frontier to welcome a policy which might enrich them by great expenditures of money, and one can see how professional loyalty may lead the Army and Navy to welcome any expansion of their sphere of activity; but for the general public to favor such a scheme seems incredible. The selfish advocates of such a policy are more dangerous enemies of the public good than are spies and traitors in war time. Happily their voice yet counts for but little and the fervent prayer of all true patriots in both countries must be that on this continent where the conditions of Europe *can* be excluded, they will never be permitted to gain a foothold. One of the most pre-

cious consequences of the overthrow of the South in the late Civil War was the avoidance of this very calamity. If the South had succeeded, the embittered feeling on the two sides of the new boundary and the open sympathy between Canada and the South would inevitably have led to extensive armaments along both frontiers, and America would suddenly have become Europeanized in this respect, to the lasting detriment of all concerned.

It is often said that *lack* of preparation leads to war, but an analysis of conditions in alleged examples will generally prove the contrary. Lack of preparation has indeed often resulted in disaster and humiliation in war, but it has rarely, if ever, been the cause of war itself. The American Civil War has often been cited as an example of a great war which resulted from lack of preparation and might have been prevented by more efficient preparation. So eminent an authority as Lord Wolseley has said: "Had the United States been able early in 1861 to put into the field in addition to their volunteers one army corps of

regular troops, the war would have ended in a few months."

Any such assumption ignores entirely the condition of affairs at the beginning of that war. If the United States had had an army corps of *loyal* men at the time, so disposed that it could have made use of them, it might have been spared some of its earlier reverses. But it did not have and could not have either of these things. The army, made up of Southern as well as Northern men, was honey-combed with disloyalty and there had been no time to reorganize it. The same would have been true no matter how large it might have been. For years prior to the immediate outbreak of war the military department of the government was in the hands of Southerners. Army, Navy, and material of war were distributed to the utmost extent possible where they might fall into the hands of the South or be so far from the theatre of action as not to be readily available. The same policy would have been applied if the military and naval forces of the government had been much greater than they actually were. Any

such supposed increase would have helped the South more than the North at first because of the greater vigor of action by the South at that period. The South had chosen its course, had banished doubt, and was pursuing a fixed and definite purpose with all the energy at its command. The North at this time was backward and irresolute, for it dreaded the irrevocable step of coercion and sought reconciliation until the rupture actually came. It carefully avoided even the appearance of a purpose to use force. Under such circumstances, everything in the line of military equipment under the old order operated to help the South more than the North in the early stages of the war. Any marked advantage in this respect over what the South actually enjoyed may have converted the first Bull Run into a capture of Washington and a recognition of the Confederacy by European Powers. That this would have been fatal to the cause of the North would perhaps be too much to assume, but it would have been a fearful handicap. We are just as much warranted in making this assumption as is the authority cited

in making the contrary. It was emphatically a case where lack of preparation did not cause war and where greater preparation would not have prevented it.

As a matter of fact it is probably true that war preparation, or the lack of it, has much less influence than is commonly supposed in preventing war. If nations want to fight, wide chances will be taken in the matter of adequacy of preparation. There never was a war in which one or both sides was not *in*-adequately prepared.

III—WAR PREPARATION AS INSURANCE

A favorite militarist argument in justification of the enormous expenditures for armed peace in modern times is that they operate as an insurance against property losses from wars which such preparation is intended to prevent. This insurance, when spread over the entire wealth of the country, is not, it is averred, so great a burden as one might think. It was recently pointed out in Congress that the cost of our naval upkeep amounts only to six-hundredths of one per cent of

the wealth of the nation. The entire outlay on Army and Navy for the year 1910 amounted to only two-tenths of one per cent of this wealth. As a premium on insurance against losses from war this is insignificant. In the same connection, a highly distinguished naval officer now on the retired list recently gave this statement to the press : "It has been figured that the cost of a fleet of one hundred battleships would not exceed one-tenth of one per cent of the property within reach of twelve-inch guns on the Atlantic Coast." And a prominent army officer has undertaken to show by elaborate calculations that a two years' war with Japan, even with victory on our side, would cost our people \$27,000,000,000. The argument enforced by all these illustrations is that the necessary expenditure to prevent these enormous losses, regarded as an insurance premium, is so small that no one ought to object to it.

It is important to call attention to the inaccuracy of such statements as these because they are typical and have an influence upon the public mind to which they are in no sense entitled. The

cost of constructing one hundred battleships on strictly modern lines would be about \$1,500,000,000, or one-tenth of one per cent of fifteen hundred billion dollars. The annual cost of maintenance would be about \$150,000,000, or one-tenth of one per cent of one hundred and fifty billion dollars. The estimated wealth of the *whole* United States is about one hundred and twenty billion dollars, and of course only the merest fraction of this would be subject to destruction from naval operations.

The figures in the second example are equally questionable. That the total losses to one side (and that the victor) in a two years' war with Japan would be nearly twice as great as the direct cost on both sides in the Napoleonic wars of nineteen years; over three times as great as that of the American Civil War of four years; fifteen times as great as that of the Russo-Japanese War, and nearly one-fourth as great as the entire estimated wealth of the United States, is a proposition which does credit to the author's professional loy-

alty rather than to his good judgment. Bad as war is, it is not so bad as that.

But irrespective of the exaggerated illustrations made use of to enforce it, the insurance theory itself is intrinsically fallacious. To classify war preparation as a national insurance is to confuse definitions. Insurance, strictly speaking, never operates to prevent those visitations which cause the losses insured against. On the contrary, as is well known, it often operates to produce them. The purpose of insurance is not to prevent but to indemnify against losses. War preparation, considered as a means of preventing war, may more properly be compared to measures for preventing losses, such as fireproof construction, precautionary measures of all sorts, the maintenance of light-houses and fog signals on dangerous coasts or channels, provision against accident to life, and so on. The use of war material after war has broken out resembles the use of organizations for fighting fires, rescuing life in shipwreck, and otherwise reducing to a minimum the loss from perils once precipitated. The only

actual parallel to insurance proper, so far as the losses from war are concerned, is to be found in the faith of the nation which may be relied upon to compensate for innocent losses of property and to make some return through pensions for sacrifice of life, limb, or health.

But taking the comparison as really intended, namely, that preparation for war tends to prevent war, or diminish its losses when it occurs, no sound objection can be urged so long as it is the best instrumentality to that end. But let it be borne in mind that war preparation often increases the danger of war, as insurance (for different reasons, it is true) increases the danger of the losses insured against. To that extent the argument is reversed. Moreover, the figures quoted above are absurdly wide of the mark. They are computed as a premium upon the *whole* estimated wealth of the country. Now only a very small portion of this wealth can ever be put in jeopardy by any war. The losses on both sides in the American Civil War (not including pensions and interest on debt) were about eight bil-

lion dollars, and in the war with Spain less than one billion. By any reasonable forecast our future losses in war will not amount to more than an average of \$200,000,000 a year, based upon our war record both domestic and foreign of the past half-century, or a tenth as much based solely upon our foreign wars. With the growing tendency to resort to peaceful methods for settling international disputes these estimates may be considered liberal. Our annual outlay for war preparation (Army and Navy) is now about \$240,000,000 with no prospect of decrease in the near future. It appears, therefore, that the premium which we are paying for war prevention, based upon a reasonable estimate of probable financial losses, is really 115 per cent, if we consider only the larger of the estimates of losses just given and ten times as great if we consider only the smaller. As an insurance against property loss this would be a pretty expensive business—in fact quite unjustifiable. The insurance argument, therefore, if considered from a financial point of view alone, is untenable.

Would a nation like ours, then, be justified, from the point of view of property losses alone, in greatly curtailing its military expenditures? Unquestionably. If that were the main argument they would indeed stand on a feeble foundation. But their true justification is based upon very different considerations—those which cannot be measured in dollars and cents. The destruction of human life, the humiliation and the uncertain consequences of possible defeat, the train of evils that follow in the wake of war—these are the real perils which a nation freely spends its treasure to avoid. It is these perils which recently moved a life-long advocate of peace in England to recede from his cherished opinions so far as to say, in reference to the Anglo-German crisis: “How idle are fine words about retrenchment, peace and brotherhood whilst we lie open to the risk of unutterable ruin, to a deadly fight for national existence, and to war in its most destructive and cruel forms!” Against these dangers, which have no money standard to measure them by, every nation must stand on its guard. If there be no

other way than by means of these enormous expenditures, then they must be accepted.

IV — WAR PREPARATION AND NATIONAL PROSPERITY

It is now quite the fad with the militarist propaganda to justify the immense expenditures for armed peace on the ground that they are essential to industrial prosperity and the protection of commerce and national wealth. But of all the arguments in favor of armed peace this is perhaps the weakest. A Service journal of high authority advances the suggestion, as a possible working basis, that war preparation should be proportional to national wealth. This manifestly has no justification unless it be that the more a nation has of wealth the more it should indulge in costly luxury. Certainly the wider the domain, the more numerous the population and the greater the wealth, the smaller will be the percentage that could possibly be injured by war. As a matter of fact, would not any reasonable scheme of defence indicate rather that it should be in *inverse* propor-

tion to national resources? Certainly it should be, if it is to be in proportion to the liability to disaster, and that really is the only criterion to judge by.

The same journalistic authority voices a sentiment which is just now growing in favor that trade expansion and industrial development are promoted by large naval expenditures and "universal military service." The example invariably cited in support of this position is, of course, Germany. The argument is an excellent example of the common error of connecting in the relation of cause and effect phenomena which have no other relation than that of occurring simultaneously. The military system, as practised in Germany, is a success because it is practised by people who make a success of whatever they undertake. It is a result, rather than a cause of Germany's marvellous progress; or more accurately it is one of the expressions of this progress. One might ask why it is that the same system does not produce similar results in certain other countries where it is practised, and also why it is that in

certain countries where it is not practised at all. A similar industrial development to that of Germany is experienced. The industrial benefits which come from compulsory military service do not result from militarism in itself. If the same length of service were enforced with military features replaced by others in the line of industrial training, even greater benefits would result.

Germany's trade expansion has not resulted from, and is not dependent in the slightest degree upon, her status as a military or naval power. "The power and empire of Germany," says the Italian publicist, Ferrero, "are not extended by the coreographic journeys of the Emperor to Palestine, gotten up in the costume of a Crusader but by those patient business men who, in Russia and Italy, in the two Americas and the extreme Orient, manage to find productive investments for capital." The same patient, plodding efficiency and skill are carrying German manufactures and trade to every quarter of the globe. The foreign customer who wants a German article does not care a fig whether Germany has one or

fifty dreadnoughts, a thousand or a million men under arms. "Made in Germany" is what he is looking for. That stamp, with all that it means, has done a thousand-fold more for German trade expansion than all her regiments and ships of war; and if these were utterly abolished to-day her trade would go on just the same—nay, even with greater expansion through the aid which the government might then give.

The example of European States certainly proves that there is no real connection between national prosperity and the size of a State or the strength of its military establishment. In proportion to their size, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands are more prosperous and have larger trade and better credit than their powerful neighbors. Vast fleets and armies do not improve economic conditions. The growth of Germany's navy has followed, not led, her commercial and industrial growth. The German nation is great, not because of her army and navy, but because her people are great. A mighty military establishment has not made the Russian peo-

ple prosperous. Even England's commerce stands as securely on its own bottom as if British warships did not cover all the seas. The present enormous increase going on in England's navy is not called for by the needs of her commerce and will not add to it a ton in weight or a dollar in value. The growing navy of the United States has not developed our merchant marine in the least. These are things that war or war preparation cannot build up, however much they may tear down or destroy.

Equally vicious and no less deeply rooted in the public mind of Europe is the belief that fortified coasts and frontiers are essential to the international prosperity of a State. A distinguished French military critic recently remarked, after describing Italy's fine system of defences, that that nation was now in a position to move on in the high road to prosperity. Of course, from his point of view, the same rule would apply to any well fortified State and the logical deduction is that the best way for neighboring States to promote the prosperity of their respective peoples is to arm

themselves and bar and bolt their doors against one another. Such a theory is in the strictest sense an anachronism. It can apply only to a society permeated by militarism and haunted by the ever present spectre of war. It might have had rational meaning in the feudal ages when the land was overrun by brigandage; but it should find no place in an enlightened nation of the twentieth century. It is indeed repudiated as to Italy by so great an authority as G. Ferrero who, in his work "Militarism," denounces as "enormous waste" the expenditure of the Italian government on its extreme programme of armed peace—amounting in the past quarter of a century to one-seventh of the whole national wealth—for it is "consumed forever and has not the power of reproduction like that invested in a prosperous business." Ferrero's strictures upon the policy of Italy are applicable to every other State in which such a policy prevails. An intelligent analysis of conditions will demonstrate in every case that these vast outlays do not promote but rather handicap the home prosperity of the people.

With some show of reason nations like Germany may claim that a powerful navy is necessary for the protection of their commerce in time of war, owing to the insufficient protection afforded by international law. The proposition (advanced by the American delegation at the Second Hague Conference) to exempt from capture the private property of belligerents not contraband nor involved in blockade running has not yet been adopted. Great Britain in particular stands out doggedly for maintenance of this ancient custom of capture. In land warfare the new rule is practically in force, but for reasons which are more specious than logical it has not yet been applied to the high seas. Naturally, in these circumstances, great maritime States are uneasy so long as it lies in the power of a neighbor, in the event of war, to destroy their commerce. With creditable candor a member of the House of Commons, discussing this subject, said quite recently: "If I were a German I would never be content, so long as the right to destroy private commerce exists, until my nation had a navy which would

make it impossible for that power of destruction to be exercised."

So far as this is a valid argument for Germany's present programme of naval expansion, it would seem that voluntary abandonment of the practice by Great Britain might result in a halt in navy increase in both nations. It would at least throw upon Germany the burden of proof that her present extreme policy is not for purposes of aggression. The refusal of Great Britain to take this important step is another example of the persistence of old ideas after the conditions which once made them effective have ceased to exist. At the present time the argument is all the other way. The principle of capture is becoming in the fullest sense a two-edged sword that cuts one way as much as the other. If Great Britain has the larger number of cruisers with which to prey upon German commerce, so she has the greater number of merchantmen exposed to German depredations. Every other nation can secure its food supply in time of war by land; England's must come in large part by sea. In

this respect also England is running the greater risk by holding to the old practice of capture of private property. English statesmen are beginning to realize the weakness of their policy, and this change of sentiment is being accelerated by the rapidly growing burdens of taxation required to keep up with the pace which Germany has set in navy building.

But while the principle of the inviolability of innocent private property is in line with modern progress and must prevail at an early day, those who expect it to result in a suspension of armament increase will probably be disappointed. The general adoption of a similar principle on land makes no apparent difference in the race for land fortification, as the examples of France and Germany abundantly prove. War depends upon deeper and more vital springs of action than that of the protection of private property. Preying upon an enemy's commerce has little real influence in bringing him to terms. It is the clash of great fleets and armies that decides the fate of war and it is to keep ahead in these respects so a

to avoid the consequences of defeat that makes nations arm. In short, voluntary cessation of armament increase by any one nation is not to be expected, no matter what the conditions, so long as a neighbor continues to arm. The desired result can be accomplished only by mutual agreement.

V — IRRATIONAL BASIS OF ARMED PEACE

The whole subject of armed peace, like that of its foster-parent, War, rests on an irrational basis. It is a creature of circumstance, almost a child of chance, utterly incapable of being reduced to any criterion. In the present state of international dealing the question has to be left to individual States to be solved by each according to its own estimate of its danger. And right here lies the chief difficulty of the existing situation. The inner councils of a State its neighbor knows nothing of. Imagination and fear are the perilous substitute for precise knowledge. Each deems it necessary to do enough to have some advantage over its rival. If one gets ahead the

other immediately seeks to overtake and pass it, and a war of armament ensues in which victory must inevitably rest with the greater resources, using this term in its broad sense. The situation is an outgrowth of fear, jealousy and suspicion due to the absence of a common understanding among nations. It is the logical result of an obvious cause and the obvious remedy lies in the one word, coöperation.

The world is just now experiencing one of the sinister results of the absence of such coöperation. Navigation of the air has reached a stage of development in which it is capable of effective use in war. The military powers, ever alert to seize upon any new device for offence or defence, are already arming extensively with these new weapons. No one pretends that the slightest advantage will be gained thereby, for all are arming at the same time and relative strengths will be changed but slightly, if at all. But there being no common understanding among the nations on the subject, each acts on its own initiative, doing its utmost to keep up with or ahead of its

rivals. Looked at from a rational point of view it is obvious that all this pending enormous expenditure is absolutely needless, and that nations are doing a wicked thing in not coöperating with one another to prevent this aggravation of military burdens. Instead of taking this really important step, however, they haggle over minor points such as the character of projectiles that may be launched from air craft in hostile operations. They permit this bird of destruction to infest the air, but they nip the extreme tips of its talons and beak so that it cannot claw and peck quite so hard as it otherwise might. Regarded dispassionately, does not this seem almost puerile? If the airship is to be tolerated as a weapon of war, let it exercise its full power. There is no mercy, benevolence or righteousness in a policy which permits a particular instrument of destruction to be used but restricts its destructive power by a tenth or other trifling percentage. The thing to do is to exclude the objectionable instrument altogether.

Many predict that the airship may render dreadnoughts and forts obsolete and thus really accomplish a vast economy in military expenditures. A few years ago we used to hear the same argument applied to torpedo boats. It was freely predicted that these inexpensive little craft would put the great battleships permanently out of commission; but the first war in which this question was really brought to a test exploded the theory altogether and led to the building of more and greater warships than ever before. Is it not likely to be the same with airships? When one considers the great difficulty of practical air navigation except in fine weather, the vulnerability of air craft within ranges at which they can do effective work, the difficulty of concealment or stealthy approach, one need not conclude overhastily that the airship will render obsolete existing material of war.

It may be said that military men are responsible for this unfortunate extension of their field of professional activity. But this is not the case. It is the duty of officers to keep their government

abreast of progress in everything pertaining to their profession. To do otherwise would be scarcely less than disloyalty. *The responsibility rests with the statesman*, and if he makes no effort to head off this new departure before it becomes too firmly established, he is neglecting one of the highest obligations that has devolved upon him in the present generation.

Referring again to the Anglo-German situation, a candid analysis discloses so many inconsistencies and contradictions as to make it seem impossible that the common sense of these two peoples can much longer stand the strain. The two-power policy of Great Britain is of comparatively recent date. A much smaller preponderance was formerly considered sufficient. Manifestly any given standard must be purely artificial and, if applicable at one time, is almost certain to be inapplicable at another. The very effort at fixity of standard is itself an absurdity. When other great powers, like Germany and the United States, take up navy building in vigorous earnest, it becomes impossible for England to

keep ahead of both combined except at ruinous cost to herself. At present it would seem that efforts are directed to maintaining twice the naval strength of Germany. This gives Germany a tactical advantage over her antagonist, for by laying down a given number of battleships she can compel England to lay down twice as many, and may thus eventually wear her out financially. And the shameless feature of this rivalry is that neither nation is gaining any relative advantage in naval strength. All this vast increase in expenditure is absolutely unnecessary and is forced upon these two nations only through their fear and distrust of each other. It is difficult to paint this picture in all its naked enormity; but if Germany were to take, say, twenty millions in gold and dump it into the sea, and if England, hearing of this insane performance, were to go her neighbor one better and forthwith take forty millions and dump it into the sea, such action would be quite as reasonable, from an economic standpoint at least, as what these nations are now doing; though its absurdity would be more obvious be-

cause divested of the illusions which so effectually befog the public mind in this business of naval expansion. There can be no question that Great Britain and Germany are recreant to their duty in not coming to a mutual understanding for the arrest of this headlong race toward national bankruptcy.

VI—A BATTLEGROUND OF THE CENTURIES

We have commented by way of illustration upon the late Anglo-German crisis, if it may be called such, as illustrative of the fact that the piling up of armaments makes for war rather than peace. Let us consider another example in which war preparation is unequivocally aimed at particular rivals and see if the same conclusion does not hold there. Rich in its record of martial deeds from the days of Julius Cæsar down, the region along the Franco-German frontier has been from the beginning a buffer territory between the Teutonic and Gallic races. Now French, then German, French again and finally German to remain, the soil of Alsace-Lorraine, during the past

twenty centuries, has been pressed by the feet of millions of soldiers, has witnessed the shock of many a battle, and is filled with the graves of countless slain. But of all its campaigns, the last and greatest—the terrible tornado of 1870—is most to the purpose of the present argument. It was a war deliberately courted on the one side to remove obstacles in the way of a great national purpose and to wipe out the disgrace of forgotten defeats; and welcomed on the other through growing jealousy of an ancient rival and the hope of rehabilitating a waning prestige. It wanted but a pretext and the pretext came, trivial in itself, but ample for the purpose—a gust of wind sufficient to fan the smouldering embers into flame.

And what a surprise it held in store for the world! Invincible France—the France of Victory—the France of Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland, and even of Magenta and Solferino—could she do otherwise than win? The world did not realize the changes that had come to pass. It did not know into what unworthy hands, from a mili-

tary point of view, the later destinies of France had fallen. It did not yet fully realize the gigantic strides of Prussia in military power and in her *rapprochement* to her sister German States. It fully realized that the scale no longer dipped so heavily on the side of France, but not that it had been so effectually turned the other way. And so when the little skirmish of Saarbruck just over the frontier took place in the early days of the war and ended with a retreat of the Germans, it all seemed natural and inevitable. But when two days later came the crushing defeat of the French at Weisenberg, followed at a like interval by the still heavier blows at Forbach and Worth, and when in full retreat the French Emperor sent back to Paris the cold comfort that "*Tout peut se rétablir*," the world began to understand that a new order of things had arisen on the continent of Europe. The great and decisive German victory at Gravelotte and the French Waterloo at Sedan paved the way to the climax of the war which came a few months later in the capitulation of Paris.

If the rapid progress of military events astonished the world, no less so did the sudden change in the political fortunes of the warring nations. Before peace was made, the new German Empire and the Third Republic of France were accomplished facts. Surely the war was productive of results as great as they were swift. But with what different prospects did these two nations take up their new destinies after it was over—one victorious, her great purpose accomplished, her territory augmented and the whole cost of the war paid for her by her vanquished foe; the other prostrate at the feet of her invader, despoiled of rich provinces, and her own prodigious losses doubled by the enormous indemnity exacted by her conquerors.

This deplorable conflict furnishes the most perfect example in modern times of the iniquity of war as a method of settling international disputes. In everything except a reasonably strict observance of the more humane customs of war, its ethics were those of the feudal ages rather than of the latter half of the nineteenth century. The

causes which led to it were supremely selfish on the one hand and hypocritical on the other and in no sense to be justified at the bar of history. Here was a great nation willing to inflict irreparable loss upon a sister State that she might accomplish important ends at home and avenge herself for ancient wrongs. On the other side the overweening ambition of an unscrupulous dynasty was ready to plunge its people into a frightful war in the hope of restoring its waning fortunes. On both sides was that large element in European countries whose voice is always for war, and behind them the vast populace who follow tumultuously wherever they are led.

And in the settlement of the war, the victorious government went to the very limit of severity which would not outrage the conscience of the world to the point of protest. It was the mailed fist, not content with felling its antagonist to the earth, but bent on beating out its life. Nothing in history is more pitiful, unless it be the fate of Poland, than the prayer of Alsace-Lorraine, when the peace negotiations were on, that she

might be permitted to remain with her old flag. But she had no voice in her own destiny. She was the mere football of fate. She was forced into an unwelcome allegiance, and 50,000 of her people gave up their homes rather than submit. It has taken a generation even partially to reconcile those that remain, and this incomplete work has been accomplished only by practically extirpating the language and customs of the people.

In all this we may not censure Germany more than France. If France had been victorious she would perhaps have been as relentless toward Germany. It is the barbarity of war itself which stifles the Christian conscience. The crushing terms imposed by Germany have left a bitterness on the part of France which a generation and more has scarcely softened. And this deep-seated hatred carries with it the never-ceasing danger of future strife where every consideration of common welfare requires the promotion of peaceful brotherhood between these two great nations.

And now everywhere along the frontier may be seen the baneful fruitage of that strife. Has

future war been rendered less probable? Alas, quite the contrary. Wrongs like these are not easily forgotten. France has arisen from the ashes of defeat and has met the overwhelming problems thrust upon her with a fortitude which has compelled the admiration of the world. But what a burden has it all imposed upon her ! The danger of war with her old antagonist has not been removed or diminished and it is the irony of fate that she has been compelled not only to defend herself anew but to bear the cost of prodigious preparations against her ; for the 1,800 tons of gold which she shipped across the border has more than paid for Germany's exhaustive offensive and defensive preparations in Alsace-Lorraine.

And such an arming as has taken place no similar portion of the earth's surface ever saw before. Alsace-Lorraine is virtually one grand fortified camp. Around Metz, the famous fortress of Lorraine, the new fortifications develop a length of forty-five miles and it would require an army of 250,000 men to invest them. But these fortifications have not been built for defensive purposes

only. They are primarily offensive in character, designed to afford a secure screen behind which to prepare a forward movement. Some of the advanced batteries, like those at Gravelotte and Saint Blaise, crowd up close to the frontier, and actually command the great north and south highway connecting Nancy and Verdun on French territory. The use of this road by the French will thus be cut off from the very instant of the outbreak of war. Farther north, the town of Diedenhofen (old French Thionville) is heavily fortified. Throughout the whole region new roads and railroads and important bridges have been built to facilitate concentration and rapid lateral movement of troops, and all that military genius and unstinted expenditure can do has been done to make the entourage of Metz not only impregnable to attack but perfectly adapted to facilitate large offensive operations.

Back of this position, both in Alsace and Lorraine, immense military projects have been carried out. The fortifications and railroad yards of Strasburg on the Rhine have been developed to

a high state of efficiency. Strong bridge heads have been built at all the Rhine crossings, with additional works to secure the free movement across and along both banks of this important river. Immense sums have been expended for points of debarkation, manœuvring grounds, barracks, magazines, camps of instruction, artillery drill grounds, target ranges, and for whatever purpose may augment the military strength of Germany along the French frontier.

Supplementary to these measures is the maintenance in Alsace-Lorraine, always in a state of readiness for instant action, of an army of more than 80,000 men, while in the Palatinate and the Duchy of Baden within striking distance of the frontier are 30,000 more. Within twenty-four hours of the outbreak of war Germany could launch against France an army of 100,000 men while back of it but a few days away is a mighty reinforcement of 500,000 more. A military writer, summing up this situation, says tersely: "Nothing has been neglected by the Germans to establish in Alsace-Lorraine an impregnable bar-

rier against invasion and a formidable base of operations for an offensive movement against France." And again, "Alsace-Lorraine, particularly Lorraine, constitutes to-day a zone of concentration for the whole German field army."

And the French, what have they done to offset (or provoke, according to one's view point) this vast preparation of the Germans ? They have almost outdone their rivals, and when one considers the appalling burdens which they have carried in the meanwhile, it becomes a question if France is really the moribund nation which she is often represented to be. We may not go into details of her defence further than to say that she has built a system of works stretching from Switzerland 150 miles to Luxembourg, approximately on the line of the Moselle and the Meuse Rivers, averaging perhaps twenty miles back from the frontier. There are four immense intrenched camps—Verdun, Toul, Epinal, and Belfort—approximately forty miles apart, each surrounded with a line of detached forts making an enceinte of more than twenty miles. Many smaller works defend

gaps in the line and block the main approaches to Paris from the German frontier. The defences surrounding Paris, which in 1870 had a length of thirty-three miles, have been rebuilt much farther from town and now have a development of about eighty miles. It would to-day require an army of 500,000 men to invest the city effectually.

In all the adjuncts of thorough military preparation, France has shown unmistakable efficiency, and her plans of mobilization will enable her to mass troops on the frontier in the early stages of a war quite as rapidly as Germany. But in a long test of strength the greater resources of Germany could hardly fail to tell, and it would perhaps prove true that her organized strength, as it might be developed at the end of six months of war, would outstrip that of France both on land and sea quite as much as does her population.

This French and German situation is the most instructive (as a warning) in the world to-day. It represents preparation for war carried to the extreme. And there is no question that it does *not* make for peace, except so far as one may out-

strip the other to an extent that makes its own success in war certain. But this very disparity of strength operates as much a temptation on one side as a deterrent on the other. And it is not materially modified by all this elaborate preparation. The advantages and disadvantages would be relatively the same without any preparation at all. These prodigious efforts are really useless as regards a test of strength and are made necessary only to keep up in a race which proceeds without rational cause.

It is difficult for an American to appreciate the gravity of this situation or the enormity of the burden which these people impose upon themselves on each other's account. But imagine a condition like this between any two sections of the United States, or between the United States and Canada, and the claim that war preparation promotes peace will appear as the veriest absurdity. It is inconceivable that such a condition can foster any virtue of manhood or statehood which is not fostered more effectually in the condition of peace, confidence and friendship which prevails

on this side of the water. The whole argument for armed peace collapses in the presence of comparisons like these, for they prove by actual example that war and its preparation are not in themselves necessary, but are necessary only because men, in their blindness and prejudice, handed down through immemorial ages, *believe* them to be necessary.

CHAPTER IV

THE RATIONALE OF MODERN WAR

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THERE is no more puzzling phenomenon in the political world to-day than the prevailing blind belief in the inevitability of war. Right here in the midst of our twentieth century civilization a wave of militarism is sweeping over the world such as has not before been witnessed since the days of Waterloo ; and, stranger still, this occurs when the movement for universal peace has progressed far beyond any point hitherto attained. What is it that sustains this persistent belief and makes the forges ring with increasing war preparation in every great nation of the globe ? Is it simply a momentary exacerbation of the symptoms of a slowly dying disease, or is it an indication that the disease itself is incurable ?

In the light of modern progress only the first hypothesis can be accepted. At bottom the ex-

planation lies in the fact that the world has not yet shaken off its thralldom to the past. Militarism is loth to admit that its day of usefulness is drawing to a close. In its efforts to resist this conviction it relies upon theories, prejudices, and practices of former times, and projects into the forefront of progress ideas which are little better than anachronisms. War can be justified only to the extent that it satisfies existing needs, and this should be determined by present conditions and not by those of the past. Let us examine some of the evidence bearing on this question and see if it supports the contention that militarism is an indispensable agency in modern progress.

I — PROGRESS TOWARD PERMANENT PEACE

The weightiest item against this contention is the progress toward peace already made. Within comparatively recent times the world has advanced from a normal condition of war to a normal condition of peace. Causes which would formerly have been sufficient pretexts for war,

nations would scarcely fight for to-day. Dynastic and religious wars which fill so large a space in European history are practically a thing of the past. One can judge something of the change that has taken place when one considers that a system of political thought which once dominated Europe absolutely has now only the feeblest foothold except among a few of the least progressive States. The day is also past, in the more highly civilized nations, at least, when the caprices of rulers are permitted to carry nations into war. Neither are we likely to see war again over disputed boundaries, questions of fisheries and similar matters. Moreover, the wars which have taken place in the past ninety years have in most instances settled forever the questions over which they were fought and to that extent have placed the cause of peace upon a surer footing. This is particularly true of those wars which have been fought for progressive ends and not on the old principles of aggression, conquest, or revenge.

Simultaneous with this disappearance of former causes of war is the appearance of new

and powerful influences uniting States in friendly relations. The peaceful tendency of commerce and finance is one of the chief examples. The business world is practically a unit in its opposition to war. The far-reaching disturbance to commercial and financial interests of even a rumor of war is like the paralyzing influence upon the human body of a sudden paroxysm of fear. Such disturbance becomes ever more dreaded as the ramifications of trade multiply and as the world becomes more and more bound up into a single business organization. Kings of finance make good hostages for peace.

The force of this argument is not broken by the fact that financiers and business men of certain classes may secretly favor war because it may favorably affect their particular interests. The perversity of human nature no doubt often goes so far, just as it makes war advocates of certain classes of military men because of its opportunities, or certain classes of journals because of its rich crop of sensationalism. These malign influences always exist, but they are relatively of small

moment compared with those which work the other way.

Then there are the great forces of industrialism, scientific research, social reform and many allied movements which ignore the boundaries of States and cleave the political world with horizontal stratifications of common interest, just as geologic strata extend from country to country regardless of the artificial lines of division which man has made. It is within the physical power of labor organizations to-day, if they choose to exercise it, to make international strife impossible. All these associations, based upon common interest, are so many forces working for the continuance of peace. Their aggregate influence, already great, is constantly on the increase.

Supplementary to these powerful influences tending to eliminate causes of war is the appearance of new methods of controlling international relations. Arbitration and international conferences, strictly modern creations, have grown in public favor until they have acquired a dignity and authority second only to those of a permanent

court of arbitral justice and a true world parliament. The advance on these lines during the past quarter of a century has been in a constantly accelerating ratio ; and even if future progress should remain as at present only without further acceleration, another quarter-century will witness the elimination of war and the establishment of a world federation. No thoughtful person, be he pacifist or militarist, can study the facts of recent history and come to any other conclusion.

But strong as is the present tendency toward permanent peace, it would be folly to underestimate the obstacles still to be overcome. These may, for the most part, be classed under two heads : Positive obstacles—those which are the outgrowth of modern conditions; and negative—those which are survivals of the past and antagonistic to the spirit of the present time. In examining these barriers to future progress, the inquiry to be kept in mind is whether they are, in and of themselves, insuperable, or whether they are of a character which must yield to the onward march of civilization.

II — COMMERCIAL IMPERIALISM

Certain anti-peace tendencies of modern times arise, paradoxically enough, from those very influences which normally and naturally are the strongest bulwarks of peace. One of these may be called commercial imperialism — a form of conquest which has largely supplanted the old and ruder method by force of arms. It is a modern phase of the old theory that conquest enriches the conquering nation, but with this point in its favor, that commercial conquests may enrich both conqueror and conquered, whereas it is doubtful if territorial conquests have any longer the power of enriching either. This form of aggression recognizes no national boundaries, but penetrates by intangible and unobtrusive methods all sections of the globe. Closely allied to it is the desire for more room on the part of certain nations who imagine (generally without reason) that their population is becoming too dense. These aggressive tendencies are particularly strong in certain great military powers (though by no means

limited to them) and this coincidence has caused much speculation as to the possible relation between militarism and commercial development. In what way, if at all, does one promote the other ? According to those officially responsible, the great military power maintained by some nations has as a principal object the protection of commerce and its promotion through the maintenance of peace. But the world at large suspects that it has a deeper purpose; that it is opportunist in character, and that war itself, in certain contingencies, would not be unwelcome in backing up daring projects of commercial and political expansion.

An example of this feeling may be seen in the general distrust of Germany's protestations that her immense war preparations are solely in the interest of peace. To the average mind the means seems out of all proportion to the end. Ambition for commercial, if not political, aggression appeals to one as a more reasonable explanation. A virile and industrious people, believing implicitly in the great destiny of the Fatherland, stand-

ing at the very front in all phases of intellectual progress, rapidly assuming leadership in international commerce, universally recognized as the world's foremost military power, Germany is a great world-force, pent up in all too narrow limits, seeking to burst forth into wider fields of activity. She has come into her inheritance too late to be an important colonizing power, for the available territory is already preëmpted. Her vast trade finds market under other flags. The stream of emigration which flows from her shores goes to the building up of foreign nations. Even near home her great commercial river has its outlet in a petty foreign State, as if the delta of our Mississippi were in foreign territory. Another petty State commands her principal outlet to the sea. Is it otherwise than natural that a nation of such character and so circumstanced should feel restive of her restraints and should dream, though never so indefinitely, of some day throwing them off? Cannot one discern in her policy of naval expansion something more than a policy of national defence? May she not be preparing for oppor-

tunities and would she not welcome war, as she welcomed it with France forty years ago, in the hope that it would bring her a larger realization of her destiny as a world-power? Is the pan-German dream the dream of idealists only, or does it also find lodgment in the minds of those who direct the political destinies of the Empire?

Such ambitions are natural in any vigorous people. They are a feature of that individualism in States which is itself a disturbing factor in the world's peace. Nations like men prefer to push their fortunes in their own way and this impulse is particularly strong in military powers like Germany and Japan. The peril of these ambitions is that they are too liable to be exercised without due regard to the rights of other States. As with men so with nations the true welfare of all requires mutual concession. The notion that the prosperity of one promotes the prosperity of others and that to injure a neighbor is to injure oneself is only dimly discerned, even at the present day; yet it is rigidly true, and the failure to recognize it inverts the perspective of interna-

tional relations and is responsible for some of their gravest dangers. If Germany, for example, were to invade England to-day and impose her will upon the British nation it would bring her no material advantage which she cannot obtain in larger measure by peaceful means while it would entail enormous losses even upon herself. If she were to wrest from England one or all of her colonial possessions it would prove a barren gain, for she could never extort from unwilling and alien peoples what even the mother country long since gave up attempting.

Apparent faith in illusory prospects of this character is what makes Germany, in the minds of many people, the chief obstacle to-day in the way of world-organization for permanent peace. The rest of the world is ready. With her consent—certainly with her leadership—the knell of war could be sounded within a very brief period. But the policy of the Empire in this respect, as official desire would apparently have it understood, is not that of coöperation, but the maintenance of peace singlehanded among

its neighbors through its preponderating military power. In the hands of a sincere devotee of peace such a programme may indeed seem to be one of exalted humanitarianism; yet the rest of the world cannot be blamed for wondering why a nation should impose upon itself so prodigious a burden for an altruistic purpose which can be accomplished more effectively without any burden at all; and it might fear that a successor would not find this negative policy to his taste, but would seek to turn to some positive use, as did Frederick the Great, the mighty military machine which he had inherited.

Commercial aggression offers its chief danger points where nations come in contact with one another in their efforts to exploit barbarian or semi-civilized peoples. Yet in very few instances in recent times have wars actually resulted from this cause. The only prominent exception is that of the Russo-Japanese War in which two nations, pursuing identically the same aims of territorial aggrandizement, placed themselves in each other's way. One found it expedient to yield for the time

being, but no one believes that the result was final or that another clash will not come unless higher influences intervene.

In Africa the spheres of control are becoming progressively better defined and the problems of that great continent are peculiarly of a character which reasonable concession on the part of the occupant nations should solve without appeal to arms. Wholly in the field of conjecture is the bearing upon the world's peace of the spirit of unrest which permeates Asia from the Bosphorus to the Yellow Sea. But certain it is, that nowhere else is the duty of a broad-minded coöperation among Western powers so imperative as in their task of guiding these myriads of the earth's inhabitants to a higher plane of political, material and moral existence. The "white man's burden," if it is to be such, or better, the civilized man's burden, can be more easily borne by mutual assistance than by mutual antagonism.

One example of the dangers of commercial aggression may be especially noted because of its peculiar and momentous character. For genera-

tions China has been a victim of Western greed. Vampire-like, the nations have fastened upon her soil, corrupted her people and subjected her to countless humiliations. This may not lead to war among the trespassing nations (though it may) for they are in a certain sense in league in their policies of aggression; but it may yet lead to a struggle with China herself such as no portion of the earth has yet witnessed.

China is the oldest nation in history and the least warlike. While great military powers, one after another, have arisen and passed away, she has come down to the very present with her ancient institutions and with a vigorous race of high intellectual and physical power. Her civilization would not satisfy Western peoples, it is true, but it has pointed the way to many things which theirs possesses, and it has solved the problem better than any other of maintaining through vast periods of time a dense population without loss of individual vigor or sacrifice of its ideals. Her policy of peace excites the contempt of the West, but has she any reason to abandon it except that

furnished by the piracy, rapacity, and aggression of those very powers who boast of their superior civilization? It will be solely to defend herself from the wickedness of those who affect to look down upon her that she may yet find it necessary to transform herself into a military power. And may we not foresee the hand of retribution in the change which is being forced upon her? If, with her so-called awakening, there should come an army and navy even one-fourth as strong compared with her population and resources as that of Japan, the world would be confronted with the greatest military power that it has ever seen, and the nations which now spit upon her may grovel in the dust at her feet. As rapid a transformation as Japan has undergone would produce such a result within the next quarter of a century. This "yellow peril" cannot be averted by continued aggression, by stinging humiliations like the Keteller monument—in short, by dealing with China in the spirit of an age long past. It may be that world-federation, with its necessary corollary of justice in international dealings, will

prove the only influence which can solve the problem and avert the threatening danger.

Before leaving this particular topic, reference may be made to certain recent phenomena which furnish additional proof that the world in general regards as wholly insincere the professions of Germany and Japan—chief exponents of the policy of commercial imperialism and aggression—that their mighty war preparations are only in the interest of peace. The prodigious efforts that Great Britain is making to offset Germany's naval expansion, and the greatly increased efforts of the United States in recent years to strengthen her position in the Pacific, are an example. Another is the deep and fervent enthusiasm with which Australasia welcomed the visit of the American battleship fleet on its voyage around the world—an enthusiasm which was mainly the outgrowth of distrust of the designs of Japan and a belief that defence against possible plans of aggression lay in strengthening the bonds of interest among the great commonwealths of the English-speaking race. Still another example is to

be seen in the recent tendency to closer unity of the parts of the British Empire after a long and gradual drift toward complete independence. It is primarily a sentiment of fear which is leading the self-governing colonies to aid the mother country by providing more completely for their own defence, and which promises to bring about a federation on a practical working basis among the component parts of the Empire.

Let friends of peace who are downcast at apparent evidences of retrogression in their cause look well ahead. May they not see in these adverse appearances an underlying tendency in the right direction? May they not discern a quiet yet persistent strengthening of those bulwarks of peace which must convince nations like Germany and Japan of the futility of dreams of world-dominion, or Continental dominion, or sea-empire, or any similar vast designs which their ambitions may contemplate? Never again, until civilization falls from its present high estate, will the phenomenon of the Alexandrian conquests, or the more enduring empire of Rome, or even

the ephemeral dominion of Napoleon be witnessed upon this earth. Control of the Pacific Ocean is not for Japan nor the United States nor any other nation whose shores its waters wash. Britannia, with more and greater ships of war than ever before, no longer "rules the waves" as she has ruled them in the past and her former dominion will not return again. Civilization is away past the possible recurrence of phenomena such as these. The better-governed States may doubtless further absorb those peoples who lack the ability to govern themselves, and there may be further consolidation of territories whose union would promote the best interests of the people; but actual armed conquest or forcible annexation of any well-organized State by another is hardly a possibility of the future.

III — RESTRAINTS UPON TRADE

Another source of international estrangement which is peculiarly a product of modern times is the artificial restraint upon trade through the tariffs which most nations have established. The

commercial interdependence of States is now so great that these arbitrary restrictions upon intercourse inevitably lead to individual distress which governments are compelled to listen to; and it is quite conceivable that such distress may become so great as to be intolerable and lead to war as a measure of relief. If, for example, Great Britain, which furnishes so rich a market for German products, were to impose a tariff which would exclude a large portion of such products, it would bear very heavily upon the German people and might lead to reprisals and indirectly to war. In a way, tariff walls are armed peace in the commercial world, each nation fortifying itself against every other and thus creating unfriendly feelings similar to those aroused by rival war preparations. Tearing down these walls makes for the extension of intercourse, freer communication, and helpfulness among nations. It is the peaceful method. Building them up makes for exclusion, restriction of intercourse, provincialism in national relations, individual hardship and international antagonism. It is the war-

like method. Nations have gone to war for causes altogether trivial compared with this and the perpetuation of such a system must inevitably be a continuing source of friction. In the minds of some of the world's great political thinkers it is the most serious danger point in international relations. Said Chancellor Lloyd-George, of Great Britain, as reported in a recent interview: "Why are armaments excused? Because tariff war, which is almost universal outside Britain, may lead to war of the other kind. Nations make war for markets, desiring to close these markets to their rivals. Every protectionist in our country assumes that every foreigner is in trade not a customer to be sought, but an enemy to be fenced off. Hence a mood of mind is produced in which war seems natural and inevitable, and hence also these armaments which are the curse and disgrace of our civilization."

If the system had in it elements of good which might offset the evil tendencies just noted, it would stand not wholly without justification; but even stronger in condemnation of it are other

considerations of an economic and moral character. Practically the whole weight of educated opinion the world over regards the tariff system an economic mistake. It cannot be successfully gainsaid that the greatest good to the greatest number will be promoted by such perfect freedom of trade as will allow any part of the world, without let or hinderance, to go to any other part to buy or sell. A nation can theoretically erect so high a tariff wall as to shut itself off commercially from the rest of the world and thus become completely self-sustained; but there is no nation where this can be done without some waste of human energy and in most of them only at ruinous waste. Perfect freedom on the other hand gives an automatic adjustment of supply to needs. It yields the largest result of which a given expenditure of energy is capable. It works along the line of least resistance, and it is humanitarianism as opposed to national selfishness. It permits the life blood of trade to flow freely in natural channels, resulting in harmonious and healthy growth, instead of binding the arteries

here and there, producing atrophy in some parts of the body commercial and unsound overgrowths in others.

With strange inconsistency most nations condemn the system at home while upholding it in their relations with other nations. In the United States there is not a custom house on the boundaries among its forty-eight States. Trade moves from Maine to California, from Puget Sound to the Gulf of Mexico with no artificial obstacle in its way. Every part of this great country can have the best which any other part produces with no other restraint than that of distance. Undoubtedly to this freedom of trade which our fathers secured to us in our fundamental law is to be found one of the greatest blessings of our political system. The same relation subsists among the component parts of the German Empire. But Germany and the United States refuse to recognize as between themselves the principle which they apply at home. They erect trade barriers against each other which they would never permit their own States to erect among themselves.

Why is this so ? Because the lesson learned and applied at home seems to them quite inapplicable abroad. In foreign trade, as in war, nations are still subservient to the traditions of the past. It is the old delusion that prosperity abroad is incompatible with prosperity at home ; and that the last thing to be considered is helpfulness toward a rival State. It is the anti-Christian spirit that makes nations rivals instead of co-partners in the great work of promoting the welfare of their people.

A proof of the intimate practical connection between tariffs and war is seen in the fact that one is used to sustain the other. If war budgets could be eliminated the revenue function of tariffs would in most nations become unnecessary, for the saving in outlay would exceed the tariff income. Thus, while free trade is, in its very nature, a promoter of universal peace, disarmament in its turn will be a powerful bulwark of free trade.

IV — RELUCTANCE TO YIELD SOVEREIGNTY

In treating of the second class of obstacles to the progress of the peace propaganda — obstacles which we have termed negative because they are reactionary and non-progressive in their origin — we may anticipate a fuller treatment further on so far as to specify the forces for peace which these negative influences resist. The war method of settling disputes stands to-day on a tottering foundation because other and better methods have come into use. Arbitration and international conferences have already so far supplanted the old method that if present progress continues uninterrupted for another generation they will have practically appropriated the whole field of international controversy.

One of the chief obstacles in the way of thorough going measures, such as obligatory arbitration or permanent world federation, is the natural reluctance of States to give up any portion of the absolute sovereignty which they now enjoy. Admiral Mahan, a leading skeptic of the modern

peace movement, says of compulsory arbitration that nations feel an "instinctive revolt against signing away beforehand the national conscience by the promise that any other arbitrator than itself shall be accepted in questions of the future." And yet there is not a single valid objection which in this day can be established against such a course; that is, none which is inherently sound and not an outgrowth of tradition, prejudice, and unfounded fear.

The fundamental defect of such objections may be illustrated by a hypothetical example. Suppose that the project of building a tunnel under the English Channel from England to France were to be revived. What would constitute legitimate objections to the project and what would not? If the physical difficulties should appear to be practically insuperable, or if the cost promised to be so great as to make the project financially impracticable, either of these obstacles would be valid and conclusive. But if the project were feasible in these respects but were to be deferred because England felt an "instinctive

revolt" against permitting any land connection between her soil and the Continent, such an objection would not be valid in the same sense that the others would be. It would be purely factitious in character, an outgrowth of past political conditions, largely a creature of imaginary fears, and in no sense of sufficient weight to entitle it to stand for a single day. And yet this invalid objection, so long as it should be entertained, would be just as effective in preventing the execution of the project as insuperable physical or financial obstacles would be.

In like manner, objections to obligatory arbitration or world federation are of a character which cannot stand the test of analysis. They do not rest upon any inherent defects in the method itself, but only upon the prejudices, jealousies and fears of governments, all of which are an inheritance from past conditions. And there is all the less excuse for holding these objections any longer because recent experience has refuted them completely. What nations revolt against doing, according to Admiral Mahan, they have

already done to a certain extent over and over again. The difference between what has been done and what it is proposed to do is not one of kind but only of degree. The progressive curtailment of personal freedom of action, and its transfer to society as a whole is the distinguishing characteristic of advancing civilization. Likewise the surrender of some portion of the absolute sovereignty of States, some portion of their freedom of will or "conscience," as one may call it, has been a marked feature of all recent development of international relations. Such development is possible in no other way, and the most notable achievements of the past century in nation building are based upon this very foundation.

There are ample precedents of the very highest character, not only among those nations that are friendly to the advanced peace movement, but among those who are indifferent to it. Witness the thirteen independent nations of America—so recognized by Great Britain—who, in forming their present government, signed away many of their sovereign rights, among them that of mak-

ing war. That experiment was successful. . No less so has been the fusing together of many independent States into the present German nation, in which every step was founded upon this principle toward which it is said that nations feel an "instinctive revolt." More directly applicable to the principle of arbitration are the examples of Norway and Sweden and of Argentine and Chile—nations in whom the military instinct is strong, yet who have bound themselves by solemn obligations to settle their future differences on a peaceful basis. Many other examples might be cited and the number is constantly increasing. It is only a matter of time and education when governments will realize that the modicum of sovereignty, which they may individually surrender to a joint organization among themselves for the promotion of their common welfare, will be returned many fold in resulting advantages of national security and prosperity.

Those who hold that a nation cannot accept "any other arbitrator than itself" on questions of the future assume an untenable position. They

ignore the fact that a nation *must* submit to some other tribunal than itself all such questions which it cannot settle by direct negotiation. If it be not a peaceful arbitrator, then it must be WAR—the most uncertain and the most unjust of all arbitrators! If it will not sign away its conscience to an august and impartial tribunal, then it must throw it away upon the mad arbitrament of the battlefield. No nation, by and of itself, can settle its disputes with other nations. It must be peaceful adjustment or the sword. Which method should an enlightened public conscience prefer? From which is justice most surely to be expected? There can be but one answer except from those nations who have the power and the perverted conscience to enforce their desires whether right or wrong.

An indication of this reluctance of nations to go to the full limit of unrestricted arbitration is seen in the reservation, in nearly all general arbitration treaties, of questions relating to territorial integrity or independence, vital interests and national honor. All these reservations except the

last may be classed as "vital interests," a term which has not received authoritative definition, but which may be taken to include all interests deemed essential to the life or integrity of the State. An analysis of certain examples of such interests and of question of national honor shows quite conclusively that they will not prove serious obstacles to coöperation whenever nations for other reasons are willing to act.

Territorial integrity is indeed one of the tender spots in international relations. There is nothing more difficult to accomplish by peaceful means than a radical change in boundaries or allegiance of a State or any portion of it. So strong is this feeling that it cannot be disturbed and any agreement for an international parliament or court of arbitral justice must explicitly except from its provision all questions of territorial integrity and independence except as they may be voluntarily submitted by the parties in interest. Such an exception would be broad enough to cover the case of the Monroe Doctrine as well as that of civil war.

Doubtless the right to control immigration into their borders would also be regarded as a vital interest by most nations. In our own country, for example, there will always exist an insuperable prejudice against the unrestricted admission of those African, Asiatic, and Insular races who cannot amalgamate with our people and become an integral part of us. It is a question which neither we nor any other nation would submit to any court or parliament. It is a *vital* interest. It is of more direct importance to the Americas, Australia and New Zealand than to Europe because of their sparser population and greater attractions to immigrants.

It is difficult to admit that wise statesmanship cannot draw a line satisfactory to all nations between subjects which might and those which might not be excepted from the jurisdiction of a world-organization, whether court or parliament or both. It would simply be following the successful example of the American Union and would really consist in a careful delimitation of

authority between the individual nations and the central power.

“National honor” is one of those subjects which should *not* be so excepted. This reservation in arbitration treaties is one of the most persistent survivals of the false standards of the past. It is nothing more than the *code duello* applied to international differences, without even the lame excuse which sometimes justifies the duel between individuals. A wrong is done, an apparent affront given and redress is exacted at the point of the bayonet. These so-called violations of honor, in modern times, at least, are rarely committed at the wilful instigation of governments. They are oftener accidental, unpremeditated, the result of mob-violence or other causes which the government of the offending party may deplore as much as the other. Invariably a cool temper and the use of common sense are all that is required to adjust such differences with honor to both parties. In this day, to refuse to accept arbitration of such questions, except where there is unequivocal proof of intentional insult by offi-

cial authority, would be *prima facie* evidence in the public mind of a weak cause and a determination to gain by force something that one is not justly entitled to. Happily this principle is now well established. In three important instances, not to mention others, to wit, the Alabama Claims controversy, the Dogger Bank incident, and the Casa Blanca affair, great nations have settled on a peaceful basis questions of honor which in earlier times would almost certainly have led to war. President Taft expressed what is becoming a world-wide conviction when he said recently that he could see no reason why questions of honor more than any other should be reserved from arbitration.

V — THE INTERNATIONAL SHERIFF

But how about an international sheriff? asks the militarist. All statutes and court decrees rely for their execution upon the possible use of physical force. The sheriff is as necessary a functionary as the judge or the lawmaker. But what will your international sheriff be, or how will the laws

of your central parliament, or the decrees of your central court, be enforced against a recalcitrant State?

The broad answer to this objection is that there is not likely to be any recalcitrant State. It is true that this is widely considered the gravest feature of the problem of world-organization and one that may prove fatal to its successful solution. But it is probable that these fears are greatly exaggerated. It may be taken as a rule that the more highly constituted a court or legislature, and the farther removed from local or individual influences, the more readily will its decrees be accepted. While the policeman, constable, or sheriff may be necessary to compel an individual to keep the law, it is unthinkable that a State of the American Union or of the German Empire would forcibly resist a decree from the supreme authority of the land. International law and treaties and the findings of boards of arbitration do not require physical force to give them effect. The most thorough-going militarist does not venture to dispute that international conventions, like the

many provisions for the amelioration of the barbarities of war, require no coercion for their substantial observance by any self-respecting government which has formally accepted them. Of something like two hundred and sixty arbitration awards in the past ninety-five years, all, with very few exceptions, have met with prompt acceptance, though some have been extremely unwelcome to one or other of the parties. But how much greater than the authority of our Supreme Court, or of the parliaments of any nation, or of unwritten international law and customs, or of special boards of arbitration would be that of a duly constituted world court or parliament ! Such a body would draw to it the most eminent talent, culture and experience in the world. It would constitute the most exalted judicial or legislative tribunal known to history. Its deliberations would be on the highest scale of dignity and justice and its decrees or statutes would command the respect even of those who might wish them to be otherwise. A nation would hesitate long before it would disregard the decree of

a court which it had helped to constitute, or repudiate the law of a parliament in which it had its full quota of representation. The main sanction would always be of a moral character, and it is not likely that a resort to physical force would ever be necessary.

World-wide public opinion would be the international sheriff. The most hopeful factor in this great problem is the deference which nations now pay to the good opinion of their neighbors. Possibly governments themselves do not fully realize its great influence; but one everywhere sees examples of it. When King William and Bismarck greeted General Sheridan at their headquarters at Gravelotte in 1870, their first and most anxious inquiry was as to public opinion in America upon the justice of the war. When the United States entered upon its war with Spain its respect for this opinion was so great that it notified the world by solemn enactment of its reasons for making war and its disclaimer of any purpose of aggression or conquest of Cuba. No nation can to-day afford to fly in the face of public opinion. There

are even purely selfish reasons why it cannot do so, for such a course would inevitably react upon itself and it would realize sooner or later that it could expect no better treatment from others than it is prepared to give in its turn. And so it will surely result that whenever the nations of the earth organize among themselves a great court or parliament they will require no coercion in the observance of its decrees.

It has indeed been suggested by one of the highest living authorities on these questions that the great powers organize a league of peace and by means of a jointly controlled naval and military force maintain the peace of the world; but if the world ever takes the step of organizing a true judicial high court for the determination of international controversies, or a world parliament for the regulation of purely international affairs, it is not likely that such a force will be found necessary. The great moral influence of world public opinion is far-reaching and exercises a silent restraint, even in the absence of formal conventions. How much greater must it be when nations

make an avowed submission to the common judgment of mankind of *all* questions of difference that may arise among them. Tennyson's "common sense of most" will then be found sufficient to "hold a fretful realm in awe," and armies will give way to reason as the executive agency for carrying the universal will into effect.

VI—ATTITUDE OF MILITARY MEN

The inertia of human progress as affecting this particular subject is further illustrated in the attitude of military men. To them the army and navy are a profession and they do not like to see it abolished. Even war is welcome because of the opportunities it brings. The maintenance of the existing order, therefore, naturally finds its chief support among military and naval officers. Almost to a man they scout the possibility, if not even the desirability, of universal peace.* Serv-

* The following extracts from a paper by Colonel Richard Gädke, the great German military critic, published in the November (1910) "McClure's" which appeared after this paragraph was written, might indicate that there are exceptions of very high authority to the above statement. This paper is so full of sound practical sense and a lofty

ice journals devote a large part of their attention to a refutation of the arguments of peace advocates. All disguise the real aim of their propaganda by calling it maintenance of peace through preparation for war; but there is never a hint that the time may possibly come, or would be desirable, when the *raison d'être* of militarism will cease to exist. The social force of the services moreover and their wide and influential relationship make them a powerful factor in their self-perpetuation.

conception of the whole problem that no apology is necessary for the lengthy excerpts made in this footnote:

“Although civilized mankind in Europe and America really forms one great community, united by innumerable bonds of similarity, we still believe that we are separated from one another by abysses, and say all manner of evil of one another. . . . The whole of Europe appears to have been converted into a great armory where all the material, intellectual, and moral forces are applied in the service of one single idea—the service of destruction. . . . War begets chauvinism and armaments; armaments beget distrust; and distrust, in turn, augments armaments in the same ratio as these increase distrust. It is a vicious circle into which the civilized world of our day appears inextricably to have fallen. . . . Undoubtedly, neither England nor Germany desires war. But—I must repeat again—in the mutual distrust between the two nations, in the competition of armament which it provokes

This influence is strong even in our own non-military country; but what must it be in that great armed camp of Europe? To discontinue military and naval establishments in some of those countries would revolutionize the very organization of society. There are probably 200,000 commissioned officers in the permanent service of European governments, while four million men are regularly under arms. The officer class, and a

and the aggravation which this economic burden imposes upon the people, lies the possibility of a sudden, fierce outbreak. . . . I believe I have demonstrated that the last and greatest danger to peace is the excess of armaments, which keeps the thought of war awake in the hearts of the people. . . . No private individual, no cautious business man, would lay out so much for insurance against fire and burglary that, for the sake of a possible danger in the future, he would place himself in financial straits in the present. [Referring to the insurance argument for armed peace.] . . . War between the Germanic nations would be a crime against humanity; it must be prevented at all costs, and will be prevented so long as there is a single spark of conscience or common sense left in the statesmen and in the people. . . . Therefore, the time has come when we should earnestly consider a limitation of armaments. . . . Nothing but binding agreements between the nations can avert, in a peaceful manner, the dangers that are ceaselessly lying in wait for us."

large percentage of the subordinates, are in the service as a life work. Their influence pervades every department of government and is a powerful force against any movement for disarmament. The very thought of the people is saturated with the military idea. A villager or countryman in our own land may not see an army uniform twice in his lifetime, but in Europe it is in constant evidence in every locality no matter how remote. To an American the sight of a fortified town (except certain seacoast fortifications) can be had only by going abroad; in Europe vast fortifications are visible on every hand, inland as well as on the coast. So powerful is the hold of military tradition upon the minds of the people that even those who suffer most from present burdens cannot conceive it possible to live without them. Were disarmament to take place to-day the military idea would decline only as the present generation passes away, and the hope of its resurrection would long continue a disturbing factor in political life.

VII — IRRATIONAL BASIS OF MILITARISM

Nothing demonstrates more forcibly the irrational basis of modern militarism than the slough of contradictions in which it constantly bemires its advocates. War is in one breath extolled because it "develops man's noblest virtues" (Moltke) and in another condemned because it "costs more than it comes to" (*idem*). Extravagant praise of its benefits falls from the same lips with the most strenuous protestations of abhorrence. With what inconsistency do the war lords of Europe praise the virtues of war as essential to true nobility of character yet insist that their sole desire is the maintenance of peace ! This attitude would be supremely ridiculous if it were not so flagrantly dishonest and so fraught with danger. There is, of course, a screw loose somewhere. If war is so good a thing that human character cannot be properly developed without it, then it is too good a thing to be such an object of aversion as governments profess to regard it. The paradox arises from the "immense concession," to use

an Emersonian phrase, unconsciously made to militarism. The whole premise of the pro-military argument is fallacious. Militarism, as we have elsewhere endeavored to show, does not foster any virtue which peace may not foster more effectually. On the other hand, it tends to degrade certain of the essential virtues, such as industry and self-help. If it makes spasmodic displays of strenuosity, its general character is quite the opposite. Men are too ready to judge from the occasional and spectacular rather than from the average. A single battle of a few hours' duration glosses over years of negative achievement. In short, the extravagant encomiums lavished upon militarism are for the most part based upon false assumptions; and this is why it is that militarists, though bewildered and deceived by superficial appearances, practically and perhaps unwittingly recognize the truth by insisting that peace is the real object of all their endeavors.

“The greatest enemy of the future is the past,” is only a half truth, for the past is also the future's greatest friend; but it is strictly applicable to the

subject here in hand. Subserviency to worn-out theories of a former regime is the chief hinderance of the peace movement to-day. But the very fact that modern militarism does stand on an irrational basis is the certain assurance that it will eventually disappear. The growth of civilization is the progressive triumph of reason over unreason and the false theories which underlie the popular belief in war must inevitably collapse with the increasing spread of education.

It is in the diffusion of more correct theories upon this subject that peace-workers in all nations are rendering an inestimable service. They are building up a world-wide sentiment against war and armed peace which will eventually force governments to act. They are educating mankind to see that there is no virtue in war which cannot be better fostered in peace; that war possesses no civilizing influence which peace does not surpass; that justice is better secured and honor better protected by peaceful tribunals than by the sword; that trade and industry do not require military power to develop or protect them;

and that the present mad competition in armaments serves no useful purpose, but deprives civilization of tremendous resources which are necessary for its highest advancement. However disheartening the work may at times appear, if steadfastly persisted in, it must eventually succeed; for, reduced to its simplest terms, it means the conquest of truth over error in this great problem with which men have struggled from the beginning.

CHAPTER V
THE PRESENT DUTY

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THE PRESENT DUTY

I — INDIVIDUAL DISARMAMENT IMPRACTICABLE

THE duty to be considered here is not that paramount obligation now being so well performed by friends of peace throughout the world—of preaching the gospel of peace and awakening public thought from the illusions which make war a possibility—but the present duty of governments, particularly that of the United States, upon the specific question of disarmament. The development of our subject has reached a point where the militarist may reasonably demand a declaration of intentions. He may say — “You have proven to your own satisfaction that war is wickedly destructive of human life, costly beyond estimate, economically ruinous, and morally degrading; and that armed peace fails in its alleged purpose of preventing war and

is unnecessary for the promotion or protection of commerce. Logically, therefore, it is the duty of every civilized nation forthwith to disband its armies, dismantle its navies, demolish its fortifications and proclaim its purpose not to make war any more. Have you now the courage of your convictions, and are you ready to stand by the colors which you have run up?"

It is at this point that moderates and extremists on this subject part company. Both look forward to the same Utopia, differing only in their method of reaching it. Specifically, the conservative peace advocate does not believe that the best way to secure permanent peace or universal disarmament is for any one nation by itself to set the example regardless of what others may do. The influence of such an example, in the present state of public thought throughout the world, would lead to no good results. It is necessary to deal with the world as it is, even while laboring assiduously to change it. Nations do not yet take what we have called a rational view of war. They believe in its necessity, its positive advan-

age and even in its righteousness. Imperial ambition still worships at the shrine of Mars. So long as these things are true, so long there will be danger of war and so long must nations act in accordance with the imminence of such danger. It matters not that measures of preparation outrun all reason, growing by the impulse of their own growth, until the world despairs of seeing an end; the duty itself is none the less imperative and every self-respecting government must meet it. The national peril of war—especially of unsuccessful war—is so great and far-reaching that no nation can sit idly by and invite it by its own inaction.

All great peace advocates with few exceptions have taken this view. Washington longed for world-peace and hated war with all the strength of his great character; yet no one has urged more forcibly than he the necessity of adequate preparation so long as there is danger that war may come. Franklin would be sneered at to-day by militarists as a sentimentalist on this subject, for he was always outspoken in condemnation of war.

Yet he himself recognized the impossibility of national disarmament by individual action. He said, "If one power singly were to reduce her standing army it would instantly be overrun by other nations." The past few years have furnished some striking examples. Mr. Frederick Harrison, a life-long apostle of peace, has come out in most strenuous advocacy of England's duty to meet what he believes to be a great national danger. Ambassador James Bryce, in an address at the Lake Mohonk conference in September, 1909, presented a powerful plea for peace and disarmament; but in the course of his remarks he said, "Every nation must, of course, be prepared to repel all dangers at all likely to threaten it." What could be stronger than this? His "of course" assumes it to be an axiomatic proposition. He includes "all" dangers — not imminent perils only, but remote ones as well — any, in fact, that are "*at all*" likely to threaten. Recently a little book appeared in England entitled "Europe's Optical Illusion," an earnest and convincing exposure of the fallacies of the common argu-

ments for armed peace. The American Peace Society thought so highly of this book that it purchased and distributed in this country many copies for their educational value. Yet it is the strongest kind of an argument against individual disarmament. It winds up with the admission that, illusory as the current war arguments are, the illusion itself exists with all the sinister consequences of actual fact; and that therefore England would in no sense be justified in abating her programme of defence.

This view of the matter and the fundamental difficulty of the problem were never more convincingly set forth than in a recent interview with that strong and devoted friend of peace, the present Chancellor of the Exchequer of Great Britain. One can discern in his earnest words the struggle in his mind between what he regards as the only righteous policy for nations to pursue and that which he is compelled to pursue on account of a purely artificial situation created by a powerful neighbor. With unfeigned bitterness he denounces the present competition in arma-

ments as "wasteful, ruinous, and suicidal." Of "twenty-five million pounds extra taxation" which he was compelled to raise, every penny was needed for social reform, yet only half could be so used on account of the demand for armaments. It was laying an appalling burden upon his people for no possible good to them except to avert a danger which was absolutely without moral justification but nevertheless very real in all minds.

But he did not allow his hatred of the system of armed peace to move him from the duty which actual conditions imposed upon him. "We cannot," said he, "disarm in the midst of an armed camp. Any remedy must be international, and we are not merely willing but eagerly anxious for an international arrangement by which we can arrest this headlong race to destruction. But when we have piped to other nations they would not dance to our music. Nay, they have even misconstrued our invitation as covering an insidious design to balk their legitimate desires for self-protection, or as an intimation that the pace was getting too hot for us, and that they had only to

keep on to see us drop out of the race. This naturally makes us chary of making new overtures for any international agreement on the subject of armaments. And until such an arrangement is arrived at we have no option but to go on sadly but with an unflinching resolution to maintain the comparative preponderance of naval strength which for a hundred years has been recognized by friends and foes alike as the irreducible minimum of our national security. . . . We do not argue about it. We maintain it and must go on maintaining it against all challengers, even if it comes to the spending of our last penny. . . . Nor are we going, from lack of pence, to risk the absolute immunity from invasion which is one of our most priceless national assets. We are open for a deal; we are anxious for a deal. But no matter how heavily we may be pressed we shall never be driven to surrender a position which, our rivals themselves being judges, is essential for our continued existence as an independent State. The basis of any such deal must of necessity be the maintenance of that

immunity. That we cannot risk by any arrangement. Such proposals lead not to peace but to war."

Probably the great majority of pacifists take this same general view of the question. Very few would advocate disarmament by any one nation acting alone. So long as nations remain unrestrained by specific agreement all must stand on their guard. An isolated example of national virtue would not promote the cause at all; it might even have the opposite effect. Great reforms are brought about not by separate effort but by combination. The railroad pass system in the United States was broken up by State and National legislation, not by individual action. Individuals who refused these favors had less influence in securing the final result than those who accepted them. It is often the abuses of evil conditions that arouse public sentiment and lead to combined effort for their eradication. Armaments will finally fall of their own weight because nations will repudiate the burden, and the quicker the burden reaches an intolerable limit the quicker

will governments be brought into united action for throwing it off.

II — APPLICATION TO THE UNITED STATES

The argument here stated in general terms applies with especial force to the United States. Disarmament by this government in advance of other great powers would be an unwise — a perilous — policy. The true line of duty is to maintain and even increase our military and naval strength, and this on the grounds (1) of prudent provision against possible danger, and (2) of strengthening the position of the United States as a power for peace. As to the first ground, differences of opinion relate mainly to the degree of preparation required and not to the principle of making adequate preparation. This was well illustrated in a recent debate on the naval bill in Congress. The chief point in controversy was whether Congress should provide for two new battleships or one. Those who voted for one did so for purposes of national defence; those who voted for two did so for the same reason. The

one side thought one battleship sufficient; the other side thought it required two. Strangely enough, while this difference was one of degree only, those advocating the one battleship policy seemed to consider themselves on the side of the modern peace movement and to rate the two-battleship advocates as militarists. Yet at bottom it was only a question of sound judgment as to what the actual needs of the country were. The difference itself of one battleship a year carried on for twenty years, would amount for construction and maintenance to an average annual outlay of about thirty cents per capita of our population — a tax too small to be considered, if our real defensive necessities require it. Technical opinion regards the larger expenditure as still far short of actual needs and a candid estimate of the situation justifies this view. The salient arguments in support of it may be stated.

The external policy of the United States government, we may feel assured, will never be one of aggression, but of fairness, justice, and equal favor to all other nations. Reasonable security

and a respectable standing with other nations in those outward symbols which denote national power are the limit of our military ambitions. In the face of such a policy it is difficult for any other nation to find a substantial cause of war with us, for at this period of the world's history, a civilized power feels that it must justify itself in the good opinion of the world before it deliberately goes to war. It is noteworthy that no foreign power has ever attacked us first.

Our isolation has been a tower of strength in the past and it remains so still. An extremist on the militarist side of this question recently said that "the great rampart of the ocean has utterly vanished." Far from having vanished it is a more formidable rampart than ever before. Steam, it is true, has greatly shortened distance, and a foreign enemy can now reach our shores in much less time than of old. But other things more than offset this advantage on their part. The cable and wireless give instant knowledge of their movements and a fleet could not leave their shores without our knowing it. There is now no

place in the wide ocean where a hostile ship can hide for long. The great handicap of adequate coal supply, repair ships, etc.; the vast peril to large convoys of troops, and many other difficulties which need not be enumerated, make the over-sea movement of large forces a more difficult problem than ever before if a resolute and well equipped fleet bars the way. It cannot be admitted, therefore, that modern inventive progress, as applied to the art of war, has lessened the value of our isolation.

But there is an element of weakness in our situation of which we have become fully conscious only in recent years. That is our double coast line. No other nation except Russia is so situated, and we have lately seen what serious meaning it had to her. Until within the past few years our Western coast gave us relatively small concern, for we had little fear that any great power might attack us in that quarter. Now we are more fearful of attack there than anywhere else. Thus we are in the situation of having two coast lines of enormous extent to defend, yet so far

apart that, under present conditions, neither can effectually reinforce the other by sea after war has once broken out. To meet this situation as it should be met we require a very much larger naval force than if the full extent of coast line were on one side only of the national territory.

Although justice is the fundamental policy of our dealing with other nations, what we may call our vital interests may yet make it impossible for us to be just toward others according to their ideas of justice. Not long since we were on the verge of war with Japan. The underlying cause of that disturbance still exists and always will exist. There is no likelihood that the Pacific Coast will ever consent to the admission of Orientals into their midst on terms of civil equality. If Japan should assume to consider such an attitude unjust to her, we could not satisfy her by changing that attitude. We need not notice the other influences pro and con which affect her relations with us. The fact that war was once imminent over our treatment of her subjects sojourning among us shows that the same danger may arise again.

Therefore, on the Pacific Coast, we should be prepared for war with Japan.

What should be our state of preparation on the Atlantic side? If one were to judge solely from present indications, one might indeed conclude that no preparation is necessary. We may suggest a possible contingency, based upon this same consideration of one-sided justice, and we shall exclude Great Britain, because the ties of interest and language so firmly unite English-speaking peoples the world over that war among them is becoming a remote possibility. Let us take the case of Germany. For three generations our government has stood sponsor for the doctrine that the American Continent shall not be subject to colonization by any European power. The causes which gave birth to this doctrine have practically ceased to exist. It is no longer vital to our national security. It is doubtful if it can now be considered as based upon any principle of justice. It is impossible to deny that colonization of certain Central and South American countries by certain European States would bring to such

countries better government, better people and better conditions generally. To foreign nations who take this view, the Monroe Doctrine may seem not only unjust but rankly arrogant. Assume that Germany, which has large interests in South America, were to fall out with any of those countries, and as a condition of peace (for she would certainly be victorious) were to exact a cession of territory. What would the United States do? Would she call Germany's attention to the Monroe Doctrine, or quietly forget all about it? If she *should* broach the subject and if Germany should respond that she had never assented to that doctrine and declined to recognize its validity, the United States must back down or resort to force. With Germany's military forces already in South America, with her fleet in those waters, with her convoy and coal problems already solved, the task confronting this government would not be a simple one. Nothing but a positive preponderance of naval strength would meet the situation. For this, if for no other reason, we should be prepared to wage successful

naval war with Germany in American waters north and south. If we are fitted to cope with Germany, we should, of course, be more than a match for any other European nation under similar conditions except Great Britain.

Preparation such as that indicated as necessary to our proper defence is mainly a question of naval strength. There is no present prospect that we shall ever maintain a land force in time of peace sufficient to withstand invasion by either of these nations, if once our naval power is destroyed. The question then is,—What naval strength do we require for these purposes? If we act on the defensive, so far as to await attack in our own waters, there would be a large advantage on our side in being near our base of supply and repairs and free from many incumbrances which must harass an enemy's movements. But will it be in our power to act on the defensive in either of the contingencies assumed? Clearly not. Certainly if we were to apply coercion to Germany we should have to go to South American waters—farther away than Europe. As to Japan, that

government is too shrewd to come here and attack us, unless the odds are altogether in her favor, when she has it absolutely in her power to make us cross the Pacific and attack her. Her first step would be to take the Philippines, a task which military opinion the world over recognizes as a very simple one. If she then rest on her oars, what will the United States do? There is, to be sure, a large section of public opinion in this country that would be willing enough to let Japan keep the islands; but manifestly national pride and a sense of justice to those dependencies make any such proposition impossible of consideration. We should have to go across the sea and attack Japan in a position of her own choosing. With the lesson of Admiral Rozhestvensky's fate before us, such an undertaking should be entered upon only with unquestioned preponderance of strength.

It is therefore clear that successful war with Germany or Japan requires a stronger fleet than either of those powers. When it is considered how large a part chance plays in war and how

often unforeseen contingencies decide the outcome of battles, and that defeat may mean ruin of naval strength beyond the possibility of restoration within a period of four or five years, the transcendent importance of being well prepared must be obvious to any one. It is imperative that our government place itself in such a state of preparation on each coast that it can meet these adverse conditions without fear; and this brings us back to the question, What naval strength do we require for this purpose?

In the present situation it would be impossible to reinforce one coast from the other after the outbreak of war in time to anticipate a hostile attack. The mere statement of distances shows this. San Francisco is 13,107 miles from New York *via* the Horn. Yokohama is 4,521 miles from San Francisco, or one-third of this distance, and Hamburg is 3,577 miles from New York, or one-fourth of this distance. Reinforcement in face of a preponderance of distances of 8,600 miles in one case and 9,500 in the other, with no port of call except on neutral territory, would

manifestly be impossible. Under present conditions, therefore, our safety demands a fleet on each coast superior to that of our assumed antagonist on that coast.

With the Panama Canal completed the distance from New York to San Francisco, adding say 600 miles for the delay in passing through the canal, will be about 5,900 miles, which is nearly 1,400 miles greater than the distance from Yokohama to San Francisco and nearly 2,300 miles greater than from Hamburg to New York. If the passage through the canal should be without accident or unusual delay, Japan would still have practically three days and Germany five days advantage in time compared with that of a fleet sailing from one coast to reinforce the other after the outbreak of war.* How far this advantage could be offset by anticipating war and moving our fleets into closer proximity to each other, and

* The disparity of distance in favor of Germany as compared with San Francisco to East South American points, adding 600 miles for passage of the Isthmus, is — to Port of Spain about 1,000 miles; to Rio de Janeiro 2,580 miles, and to Beunos Ayres 2,600 miles.

still not precipitate hostilities, is wholly a matter of conjecture. But even with the most favorable assumption, our safety in war with either of these nations singly, after the canal is available, demands that we maintain a fleet on each coast equal in fighting efficiency to at least three-fourths that of our assumed antagonist. It ought then to be possible, without completely denuding either coast, to reinforce the other in time to defend against attack or to prepare for an offensive movement.

It is only by a safe preponderance of naval strength that we are justified in maintaining so small an army. The army ought indeed to be largely increased, but there is little prospect that it very soon will be. One hundred thousand regular troops brought to the highest state of efficiency is the very least that Congress should provide for. In addition to such a force, it is to be hoped that a way will be found for extending military training more generally among the people so that, if war should come, the government would not be compelled to recruit from absolutely raw material.

III—VOLUNTEER SOLDIERY NOT ENOUGH

Deeply rooted in the public mind is a belief that, in the event of war, our government would find sufficient reliance in its volunteer soldiery. An eminent peace advocate, and practical man of affairs as well, recently called attention to the fact that we have sixteen million men of military age in our country and that this constitutes a reserve strength which no other nation could ever overcome. Of similar tenor was the rather pompous assertion of a United States Senator several years ago that if any nation should attack us three million men would instantly rush to the defence of their country. Nothing exhibits a more hopeless ignorance of our military problems than talk of this kind. What would these men come with—scythes, axes, and pitchforks? Certainly it would not be with arms and equipments, for not a third enough could be had. Better have 200,000 men, well armed, disciplined, and equipped, to put into the field at the outbreak of war, than the

whole three million—or the sixteen million, for that matter.

The example of our great Civil War has confused the faculties of many a well-meaning pacifist in this respect. We fought that war with this same raw material, they say. Very true, and it is an invaluable proof of the sterling military qualities which are latent in the citizenship of this country. Given time to prepare, and we need fear no nation on earth. But it is right here that the history of the Civil War leads so many astray. They forget that each antagonist was just as badly off as the other. In fact there was probably never another war in which the state of preparation was so nearly equal on the two sides. While the South was developing an efficient force the North had time to do the same and her greater resources finally decided the issue. But no such opportunity would be available in a war with Germany or Japan. While we were getting ready they, with their vast military organizations ready for action, might take possession, unless stopped by the Navy, and it would require years

to dislodge them. The world will no longer brook such delay. Our own people would not "stand for" it. Too many interests suffer; and whether the government wished to continue the fight to ultimate victory or not, it would be compelled to accept peace, just as Russia, against her will, made peace with Japan. Say what we will, there is no adequate substitute for preparation when war comes.

It is hardly necessary to point out that this danger would be far greater in the case of war with Germany than it would be in one with Japan. The vast distances over which Japan would have to transport her troops; the comparatively few unfortified harbors available as bases for aggressive operations; the impracticable character of much of the country on the Pacific Coast; the fact that our reservoir of supply both of men and materials would be entirely out of her reach; the existence of practically ten trans-continental lines of railroad; and finally the immunity from active interference of fully 95 per cent of the commercial and industrial ac-

tivities of the United States, make the problem of successful invasion immeasurably more difficult for Japan than for Germany — leaving out of consideration the influence of the Navy in preventing or delaying the transportation of troops. And this does not take into account at all Japan's inferior resources, her straitened finances, nor the possible danger from her old antagonist on the mainland of Asia.

The views of military men often appear extravagant to laymen, but it is their duty to advise what we must expect, should war actually come. Having done this, the responsibility rests with the people, and they alone will be to blame if disaster follows. For let no American permit his pride of country to persuade him that we are immune from defeat. Once we suffered the humiliation of seeing our national capital burned by a foreign foe. It is just as much within the range of possibility that an equal disaster may come to us again as it was a few years ago that the great nation of Russia should go down in defeat before Japan. Until our statesmen can guarantee us against war we

must face the possibility of great national disaster unless we are prepared to defend ourselves.

There is another feature of the subject which is of much importance. Our people are, and will probably remain, fundamentally opposed to militarism. Yet there is no one thing that would so surely fasten militarism upon us as defeat in war; for such defeat, with its dangers, humiliation, and fruitage of revenge and fear, would lead to an increase of our military establishment such as will never be required if we are reasonably faithful to our present duty.

IV — FORTIFICATION OF THE PANAMA CANAL

Closely allied to the duty of maintaining an adequate military and naval force is that of fortifying the Panama Canal. While many have strenuously opposed this policy, it is difficult to see how they can consistently do so if they believe in the necessity of a navy. It would be quite as reasonable to build a great naval base and leave it unprotected as to leave the canal unfortified. For the canal will be part and parcel of our navy in

the role which it must play as defender of two coasts. It enables us to secure a given degree of protection with not more than two-thirds as large a navy as we should require without it. If we had not built the canal, we could, with half its cost, have placed on each coast a navy exceeding that of any probable antagonist. But we chose to open this great commercial highway and at the same time make it a part of our system of national defence. In this latter respect it is a duty to make ourselves secure in the advantages for which we have given so lavishly of our treasure. No possible guaranty of neutrality can be accepted as a substitute so long as the liability of war remains. To hold the canal free for passage by a nation with which we might be at war would be to sacrifice one of our chief weapons of defence. No rational consideration could justify such a course, and any other nation in a similar case would instantly repudiate it. To a nation at war with us, therefore, the canal must be closed and means for enforcing such closure must be provided.

As to all nations in time of peace, and as to any at war (except with us) the canal will doubtless be held neutral. But even this neutrality may require a powerful armament to enforce it. If the contingency should arise that a belligerent should seek passage for its fleet while its enemy was lying in wait on the other side, the United States must be in a position to protect such fleet out to the open sea, giving it an opportunity to form for battle instead of being attacked in detail as it issues from the portal of the canal. There might be many vexatious questions at such a time involving danger to the canal and failure to maintain neutrality unless the government were equipped with the necessary means to enforce its requirements.

It thus follows that both our system of national defence and the enforcement of strict neutrality as to other nations require adequate fortification of the canal.* Considering the vast sacrifices

* It is manifest that the second consideration is less imperative than the first because the Navy would be available in enforcing neutrality.

made in building this mighty work, it would be a dereliction of duty not to secure in the most absolute sense the results of such prodigious efforts. When universal peace is assured among nations, then and not till then will our government be justified in withdrawing armed protection.

V — THE UNITED STATES AS A FORCE FOR PEACE

The duty of adequate military preparation has been urged in the foregoing discussion on the broad ground of national defence, but it may also be urged on the broader ground of promoting general disarmament. This sounds paradoxical but is in reality practical world-politics. We have commented upon the futility of attempting to promote the cause of disarmament by any one nation acting independently. This applies with especial force to our own country. It may very likely fall to the lot of the United States to lead in this cause.* Her independent situation and

* The passage of a law by the sixty-first Congress providing for a commission of five members to consider the question of "limiting the armaments of the nations of the world by international agreement, and of constituting the

freedom from international alliances, entanglements and jealousies naturally fit her better than any other nation for that important role. But her influence in this respect will not be strengthened by a self-adopted policy of disarmament. Right or wrong, the great measure of a nation's standing among other nations is the outward expression of power in the form of military preparation. We should not voluntarily surrender, but rather strengthen, our influence in this respect. A great nation, we should not deliberately make ourselves a little nation.

In which situation, for example, would our proposals carry the greater weight with a power like Germany, if we were to approach that power on the question of disarmament with a naval strength as great as hers, or in absolute impotence like China to-day? In the latter case, would not Germany say: "It is all very well for you to talk to us of disarmament—you, who have nothing

combined navies of the world an international force for the preservation of universal peace," may well be considered as a practical beginning of this work.

to lose, to us who have everything to lose. It is a simple way, from your point of view, to bring about equality of naval strength between us, but you can scarcely expect us to look at it in that way." In the contrary case, however, might not the reply be: "You come to us with a fair proposition. You ask of us nothing which you are not willing to give. We will consider."*

Summarizing this portion of our subject it may be said that peace advocates in the United States can make no greater mistake than to urge an abandonment of our military preparation in advance of other nations. The work must be done in concert. No more fatuous policy could be adopted than that of slacking our efforts to maintain a sufficient army and navy simply because there is a growing prospect of world peace. Let us keep vigorously at work without thought of relaxation until the gong sounds which shall summon all nations alike to rest from their pro-

* "The voice of the United States in favor of international justice is much more weighty when it is known to have a good Navy and a good Army to enforce its views and defend its rights." — Secretary of War Taft (1907)

digious labors. And above all is it a sin to belittle the high calling of the services so long as they are a necessary part of our national life. Let our youth feel that adequate defence of their country is a high and noble duty. Let the taxpayer, whether on the coast where the ravages of war may strike him directly, or in the interior far removed from its possible devastation, bury self-interest in patriotic provision for his country's reasonable needs. The burden is not an oppressive one when spread over all the nation, and by carrying it cheerfully and in generous measure he will the sooner be free of it altogether.

CHAPTER VI
THE FUTURE HOPE

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THE FUTURE HOPE

I—A NEW ERA

IN spite of the passing shadow of fear which the topic just considered may have spread over this discussion, there is still abundant ground for the belief that the dawn of a better day is near at hand; and this notwithstanding the fact that nations are exerting themselves as never before in preparation for war. Darkness is often blackest just before break of day. The key to the situation is contained in the statement made at the beginning of this discussion, that "the whole argument for permanent peace rests upon the fact that the future of war cannot be judged from its past." Contrary to the dictum of the Preacher, this is an era of "new things under the sun." It is the era of the railroad, the steamship, the trolley car, the airship, the telegraph and tele-

phone, interoceanic canals and international cables, wireless telegraphy, the rapid-printing press, the camera, growth of population and the filling of waste places of the earth, world-wide organization of business, international associations of many sorts, treaties of obligatory arbitration, Hague conferences, and numberless developments which unite mankind in a common brotherhood as it has never been united before. The isolation of the race is everywhere breaking down. Unwilling nations are forced to open their doors. Japan, lately a barbarian nation, is at the front as one of the great progressive powers. China will follow her lead. A new life is awakening long-dormant nations and everywhere the spirit of the times is making for better acquaintance. Exclusive customs are yielding to the common customs of the world at large, and differences that once made all parts of the world comparative strangers to one another are rapidly melting away. Representatives from all nations can to-day gather at a common point more easily and safely than the representatives of our thir-

teen colonies assembled in Philadelphia in 1776. The telegraph has brought the whole world closer together than were the different quarters of London and Paris a hundred years ago. Commercially, nations are absolutely interdependent. Travel, public intelligence, emigration, and colonization are cementing all peoples together. Mutual respect is growing and mutual rights are more fully recognized. A world public opinion has come into existence. It is a new era, one which makes international coöperation possible to a degree that was formerly not possible at all. In this fact lies the true hope of the speedy realization of the pacifist's dream.

It may be said that new things cannot alter human nature. Man is and will always remain a fighting animal. As a distinguished American army officer recently expressed it, "armed strife will not disappear from the world until human nature changes." To which an equally distinguished American journalist replies that human nature *is* changing with the progress of civilization. It is not necessary, however, to accept either

of these views, for both are in principle fundamentally wrong. Those qualities which make up the sum total called human nature are the same to-day as when the earliest records of the race were written. Cruelty, selfishness, jealousy, revenge, and the whole catalogue of negative traits, as well as the positive traits of love and justice, resistance to wrong, recognition of right, are as deeply imbedded in man's nature now as they ever were. The hater of slavery of to-day would have been a slave-holder if born in the South of sixty years ago. The enlightened humanitarian in the England of to-day would have recognized as necessary the rack, block, and all other forms of inhumanity practised in the England of Henry the Eighth, if his lot had fallen in that time. The same individual would be a liberal or inquisitor in religious matters according to the circumstances of his birth and education. The latent qualities of the human heart are the same always and everywhere, except as they vary from racial differences.

But what *does* change — and this is the foundation of our faith, and proof that the army officer

is wrong—is that fund of human experience which we call civilization. Year by year, century by century, this fund grows and changes and at any epoch it constitutes the chief factor in the environment of life. Men learn from research and experience and add their knowledge to this fund. They have found that slavery is an evil morally and a failure practically and they have established the rule that men shall be free. They have learned that torture and cruelty fail of their purpose and this evidence they have transmitted to posterity. Private combat and the duel have proven themselves valueless as a means of enforcing justice or defending honor, and a realization of this fact has led to their practical abandonment. And so on through the infinite range of human relations, what men have found out of real vitality they have built into their institutions, and the child that comes into the world to-day grows up under very different influences from those which surrounded the children of one, five, or ten centuries ago. His nature is trained along different lines and subjected to different re-

straints and the same raw material yields correspondingly different results. That the outward expression of his nature has changed is no evidence that his nature itself has changed. It proves simply that, while human nature is ever the same, the growth and influence of civilization produce from this same nature ever changing results.

Applying this conclusion to the subject before us, we are outgrowing war, not because man is at heart any less a fighting animal than he ever was, but because experience is proving that war is the most unjust of methods for settling disputes between nations. It is proving that coöperation and mutual concession are immeasurably better methods. The result is that these new methods are coming increasingly into vogue and a new world-opinion in support of them is gaining strength every hour. So far has it progressed already, that if it should continue in like manner for another generation, the universal hostility to the war method of settling disputes will abolish the use of that method altogether. We shall not have to wait "until human nature changes."

II — EVIDENCES OF PROGRESS

The militarist may object that, when one considers to what extent war has been the rule in the past, the prospect of an early arrival at the goal of universal peace is not so very promising after all. A writer already quoted in these pages has pointed out the fact that in the past 3,500 years there have been only 234 years of peace. Whether the figures are strictly accurate or not, the disproportion of peaceful periods to those of war is so great as to offer little hope that the world will very soon so completely change its habit as to abandon war entirely

If this author had made a fair use of his statistics he would have added that since Waterloo there have been only about fifteen years of international strife that can be dignified by the term war. In this modern period, therefore, comprising only seven per cent of the whole period cited, is to be found thirty-five per cent of the whole period of peace. He might also have pointed out that within that same period has come into exist-

ence an entirely new method of settling international disputes. Whereas, prior to 1815, arbitration, as a practical force in world politics, was comparatively, if not wholly unknown, since that date about two hundred and sixty international controversies, some of them of a very serious nature, have been settled by that method. To show how its popularity is growing, about eighty of these arbitrations, or one-third of the whole number, have occurred in the past twenty years. It is these facts which confound the hoary argument that, because wars have always been, therefore they must always be.

Still more significant in its ultimate bearing upon the question is the growth within this same period of conferences among nations for the promotion of common ends. Arbitration generally relates only to two parties and is for the settlement of disputes which have already arisen. International conferences include several nations, sometimes all, and their object relates to the future well-being of the conferring States. It is from these conferences that most is to be expected,

for while arbitration may lead to a great world court to which all disputes may be referred, the conference may be the forerunner of a world-parliament which shall regulate international relations so as to avoid the greater portion of disputes. During this modern period there have been more than a hundred of these conferences. They embrace a wide variety of subjects, such as the amelioration of the barbarities of war and a codification of its laws, the adoption of a common standard of weights and measures, international telegraphy, monetary relations, science, commerce, marine usages, sanitation, postal union, African slave trade—in short, practically all questions of common interest to the nations of the world not of a strictly political character. They have led finally to those epoch making events, the two great Hague Conferences, which may almost pass as world-parliaments in the broad sense of that term. These conferences have codified international law and greatly expanded its scope, have laid the foundation for a permanent court to pass upon international disputes, and have even ap-

proached, though remotely enough, the question of disarmament. Something of the high estimation in which they are held among world statesmen may be judged from the following references:

Of its own work the Second Hague Conference made this declaration: "By working together here during the past few months, the collected powers have not only learnt to understand one another and to draw closer together, but have succeeded in the course of this long collaboration in evolving a very lofty conception of the common welfare of humanity." The satisfactory note in this statement is that of unity of interest on a broad and unselfish scale, and the hope which it holds out that a world federation may be organized on an equally disinterested basis of common welfare.

President Roosevelt, commenting upon the Prize Court organized by the Second Hague Conference, pointed out one very important influence of these conferences, namely, their educational value upon public opinion. He said: "The

organization and action of such a prize court cannot fail to accustom the different countries to the submission of international questions to the decision of an international tribunal."

And Secretary Root in transmitting to the Senate the Hague conventions of 1907 said that they "present the greatest advance ever made at any single time toward the reasonable and peaceful regulation of international conduct, unless it be the advance made at the Hague Conference in 1899."

Actual steps of great importance have already been taken by several nations in line with this new movement. Numerous treaties have been concluded among smaller States making arbitration of all disputes obligatory.* Perhaps the two highest examples are those of Norway and Sweden and of Argentine and Chile. While these States are relatively small, all the conditions that

* According to the Permanent International Bureau of Peace at Berne, Switzerland, there have been more than one hundred and thirty general treaties of arbitration since the first Hague Conference.

make for friction and trouble exist in their case as with greater powers, and war between them is relatively just as serious a matter. Yet these nations have solemnly promised to keep the peace between themselves and have laid down by just agreement the procedure which shall be followed whenever difficulties arise which ordinary diplomatic negotiations cannot adjust.

Even while these pages are being written the world is witness of a splendid example of the new method of settling international disputes. With the machinery created by the Hague Conference two of the leading nations of the world have just determined, on an amicable basis and to the general satisfaction of both, a question which has been a source of friction, bad blood and threats of war for nearly a century back. The conduct of the case was on the highest principles of justice and good-will, the representatives of the two powers even voting against their own countries on certain of the points at issue. The verdict has been universally commended and an object-lesson of the highest value has been given to the world.

When all these evidences of progress are considered, one may admit that the pacifist has good ground for his faith in the early dawning of a better day. If the difficulties still remaining to be overcome seem formidable, a review of the advance already made is sufficient to dispel discouragement or doubt. The inertia of human progress—that retarding force of tradition and ancient habit of thought—still blocks the way, it is true; but inertia, no matter how great, is powerless before the smallest of forces persistently applied. In this cause of universal peace, the seeds of education sown during centuries past and now being sown more profusely than ever before are the force which must eventually carry everything before it. And this sowing, whether recent or remote, is rapidly approaching maturity. The harvest is plenteous, the laborers no longer few, and when more of those in high places find courage to thrust in their sickles the hour of fruition will have arrived.

III — FEDERATION THE FUTURE HOPE

In the following effort to forecast the nature and abundance of this harvest there may be things which the so-called practical man will scoff at as being too far out of reach to have any living force at the present time. But let the critic divest himself of prejudices and fix his definitions. Will he consider a thing impractical only when it is inherently so, or also when it is popularly believed to be so? Something over four hundred years ago the whole civilized world believed it to be impossible to sail westward on the Atlantic to a great continent beyond; yet it was an eminently feasible proposition even then. The practical man of affairs rightly insists on dealing with conditions as they actually are, even if they consist largely in illusory beliefs; but this should not blind him to the fact that a proposition which is impracticable only because of accepted beliefs can remain so only so long as such beliefs continue. Let this prognostication, therefore, be judged as far as possible from its inherent feasibility, divested of

the beliefs and prejudices which now have a controlling influence upon public thought.

It may be assumed at the outset that the world's hope for the betterment of international relations lies in increasing unity of action. Laws are better than men. United action overrules the selfishness of individual action, and the joint effort of all nations will better satisfy the demands of justice than disunited action, with its possible resort to force, ever can. The position taken in this matter by that great man, Leo Tolstoi, whose memory all lovers of peace deeply revere, is a matter of genuine grief to many an ardent admirer. He condemned arbitration, peace conferences and similar efforts to ameliorate the relations of States, and held that no real improvement can come except by "there being more and more of those simple-minded men, like the Dukhobors," etc. The practical pacifist, on the other hand, holds that the intelligence of the world, guided by those Christian principles which he would, indeed, like to see actuate every individual unit of the race, must direct the destinies of men through

united action of existing agencies. Comparatively few men rule the world and it is not necessary to await the conversion of every man or woman in order to establish the principles of justice among nations. It is an obvious duty to utilize to the utmost such agencies as exist and endeavor to work downward from the leadership of the race to the great masses of men until a belief in world-peace has become a universal *habit* of thought. This will give stability to measures, whose inauguration, however, need not await such universal education. Tolstoi's doctrine is discouraging and almost hopeless, whereas the progress actually made is full of promise.

It is evident that in a really comprehensive scheme of world-peace, the mere adoption of some plan of disarmament would not be sufficient. Arbitration itself, though infinitely better than the war method of settling disputes, is still a defective method. The arbitrators named by the States in controversy enter a case rather as partisans than judges, while the umpire is too liable to be forced into the role of go-between. The

board has ordinarily but one case to consider and is bound by no established procedure. The finding is therefore more like a mediation than a judicial verdict. A universal court of justice will be a long step in advance of this. Its judges will have permanent tenure of office and will not be chosen with reference to particular cases. They will act under fixed rules and will gradually develop a body by precedents which will give permanence and stability to their procedure and relieve them of all suspicion of acting upon personal or partisan bias. But even such a court, vastly important as it will be, would not go to the root of the problem. It is not enough to remove the outward symptoms of disease; it is even more essential to renovate bodily conditions so that the symptoms will not develop. In national as in individual affairs, an ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure. Applied to the case in hand, it is quite as important to provide the machinery for regulating international affairs so as to remove as far as possible causes of dispute as it is to provide a peaceful means for their settle-

ment after they have arisen. Both ends should be attained, if possible, and for this reason nothing short of a world-government which shall regulate by legislation international affairs and settle by judicial procedure international differences will satisfy all conditions of the problem.

This is not in any sense a novel proposition. It is a source of profound satisfaction to all lovers of peace that the same general thought has been put forth in one form or another by many minds of the past who have meditated upon this subject. These early prophets may have been dreamers in the sense that they penetrated the future far beyond their fellows—so far, in fact, that the common procession is only now catching up with them—but in reality they were profoundly practical, as the world is coming to understand. No other great humanitarian movement contains a brighter galaxy of names. Speculative philosophers and practical men of affairs—shapers of world-thought in every department of life—have registered their convictions that the permanent removal of causes of armed strife among

nations can be accomplished only through some form of world federation. Erasmus, Henry IV of France and his minister Sully, Grotius, the father of international law, William Penn, the Abbé de St. Pierre, Montesquieu, Turgot and many other Frenchmen of his time, Emanuel Kant—these names indicate from what varied fields of human activity and from what illustrious leaders of thought the idea of universal peace or world-organization found expression centuries before it began to assume practical form. In geometrical ratio or even faster this early band of workers has grown since the beginning of the nineteenth century until now it includes millions of men and women from all civilized nations and from every walk of life.

The growth in number and importance of world-conferences, embracing almost all subjects of international interest, has steadily paved the way toward an ultimate world federation. But the crucial step remains to be taken. The acts of a conference require approval of the conferring powers before they are binding upon such powers.

The acts of a world-government, once created, will require no such authority. The conference has no real power of its own; the government will be entirely self-sustained. The change from one to the other will be something like the change from the old Federation of the American Revolutionary period to the Union of States which came with the Constitution.

Here, of course, will be found the chief obstacle to be overcome — the reluctance of certain nations to give up any portion of their present freedom of action. It matters not that this freedom, so far as external relations are concerned, is often more fanciful than real, nor that the necessary relinquishment will really secure better protection and more perfect freedom; there is a natural opposition to the creation of a new authority which shall be supreme over any now existing. But that such opposition is not insuperable is proven by two great historic examples drawn from political environments as diverse as it is possible to conceive — one from a land where militarism has

never gained a foothold, the other from one in which it is the very corner-stone of society.

Who ever has followed closely the history of the formation and ratification of the American Constitution realizes something of the power which fear, distrust and tradition exercise over the thoughts even of great statesmen. How many were the forebodings of honest minds as to the fate of that early experiment ! How many true and earnest men could see nothing but disaster ahead ! How difficult it was to get out of the particular mental rut in which they had been so long and realize that the wisdom of the many is generally wiser than the wisdom of the few ! Happily the "common sense of most" triumphed over all misgivings. The experiment was undertaken. The ship of State was launched and the voyage begun. In spite of rough sailing now and then, it has weathered every storm. The fears of the incredulous have vanished and the faith of the rest has been fulfilled. No one now doubts that this union of political fortunes was best for all concerned, nor that the portion of individual

freedom which the States surrendered has been compensated for a thousandfold in the blessing of a stable order of things which a central government secures.

The unification of Germany, which began in Napoleon's time and was finished in 1870, is even more valuable as a precedent because it was accomplished in the very midst of those hostile influences which are the chief obstacle in the way of the greater unification still to be accomplished. In Article XI of the Act of 1815 creating a federal union or *bund* of the North German States there is a solemn agreement which might stand almost without change as the corner-stone of a world-union. It declares that the federating States agree "under no pretext to make war upon one another, or to pursue their differences by force of arms, but to submit them to the Diet." The entire progress of German unification since that time had been along the same lines. Yet the nations of the world to-day are in many respects more closely linked together than were the German States of those earlier times. What was pos-

sible in their case is possible on a larger scale; and should be even easier of accomplishment, because a world-union would not be of such intimate character nor require so large a surrender of individual authority as was the case in either the American or German unions.

It may be objected that the final result in the case of Germany was accomplished only through the agency of a frightful war. Even so, it demonstrated the efficacy of the union and the wisdom of those statesmen who foresaw its value and would gladly have accomplished it without such drastic measures. War simply clove a Gordian knot which might otherwise have been unloosed only through the gradual wearing-out of time. It neither proved nor disproved the argument for union, but it swept away at a stroke all the rubbish of illusion, tradition and unreason which blocked the way. This indeed has been one of the most useful functions of modern war — the cleaving of Gordian knots which bind the hands of progress. But in the increasing enlightenment of the world these knots become less common and

less obdurate and it need not be concluded from the example of Germany that some great cataclysm will be required to accomplish a similar result for the world at large.

In view of what has been done and of the manifest advantages of thorough-going unity of action among nations, it is not too much to believe that a permanent organization can be formed which will take over to itself the whole business of the regulation of international affairs—a business now regulated by thousands of separate treaties between nations in pairs, by secret compacts or alliances, by international agreements unrelated to one another, by international law which has no binding force except as nations individually assent to it, and finally too often by war itself. Are we to admit that the problem of organizing a practical working machine for this purpose is beyond the capacity of modern statesmanship to solve?

It may be urged that a world-parliament is impossible of creation because of the conflict between large and small states in the matter of representation. But how would it be if the par-

liament were to consist of two houses, one representing the nations in their coequal capacity and the other the population on a numerical basis? If an executive were deemed necessary, might it not consist of a council of three members to be chosen by the parliament for definite terms, one member at least to be from the continent of America and not more than one at the same time from any one nation? And in like manner, the supreme judicial authority in the form of a court of fifteen or seventeen members might be chosen under definite rules which should deal justly with all nations in the matter of representation. And danger of undue infringement by such central government upon the rights of individual States could be wholly circumvented by strict definition of its powers and jurisdiction.

If it be urged that such a government would lack the physical force to carry its decrees into effect, it may be replied in terms of the argument already advanced that physical force will not be required for that purpose. Its sanction will always be a moral sanction. Who to-day believes

that the army of the United States or the army of Germany is necessary to enforce the central authority as against the component parts of either of these countries? Nothing could be more repugnant to the enlightened sense of either of these nations than such a suggestion. Whenever civilization advances so far as to make possible a real world-government it will have advanced beyond the point of resisting the authority of such government. There might be required a sufficient naval force properly to police the high seas, and a sufficient military force to aid in maintaining peace and order among barbarian or semi-civilized peoples during their progress to self-government; but it is scarcely conceivable that such force would be required for coercion of the members of the Union.

IV — THE HOROSCOPE OF PEACE

The power for good of such a world organization is inestimable, but we may perhaps forecast glimpses enough of it to show how essential, how indispensable, it will yet be in working out the

problems of an advancing civilization. And first of all is the fact that it would be a new force in human affairs — a force not German nor British nor American nor Oriental nor subject to any of these, but a force independent and self sustained, with a character and vitality of its own, devoted to the welfare of all nations. With time and experience, its directive influence in world affairs would become as great as that of the central government of our own country among the States of the Union. Its horizon would be world-wide and its every act would be for the closer unity, better understanding and more perfect coöperation of all portions of the earth. Directly, and even more, indirectly, its influence would affect every phase of the political, social and material welfare of men, even beyond the pale of its prescribed authority.

Foremost among its specific results would be the disappearance of war and with it the vast paraphernalia of armed peace. Beginning with a cessation in the increase of armaments there would gradually follow a decrease under uniform

rules applicable to all nations until a minimum had been reached which should be deemed essential for national police on land and along coasts. The substantial disappearance of the outward forms of militarism would not necessarily mean the abandonment of such practices as have positive utility in civil life. In those nations accustomed to compulsory military service such service might still be enforced with the substitution of industrial training for those practices which now relate only to transforming individuals into good fighting units. Not improbably all nations would come to recognize the value of such service and adopt it in some form or other.

The great service schools, like West Point, Woolwich, and St. Cyr would not be abandoned but transformed into civil institutions for the education of permanent employees in the various departments of the public service. The same high ideals of duty, the same strict discipline and thoroughness of method and the same *esprit de corps* would be carried on into their new field of useful-

ness and would bring a veritable infusion of new life into government work.

And so in other respects, whatever is good in militarism would be continued. Little attention would be paid to the silly fears of those who are wont to shudder at a bugle call or the sight of a uniform or of a body of marching men. So far as the old order could be adapted to the new, it would be done. In particular, drills and discipline, music and ceremonies, whatever conduces to physical health, exhilaration of spirit or wholesome inspiration of the faculties, would be considered as features not to be abandoned but to be turned to a new and higher use.

With the disappearance of armed strife among nations there would surely follow the disappearance of that other form of strife which we have already commented upon at length — commercial war. The discontinuance of armaments would of itself remove one of the chief props of the tariff system — its necessity as a revenue-producer — for the resulting diminution of expenditures, at least in the case of the great powers, would exceed

the reduction of revenue due to the adoption of free trade. Armed strife and tariff war are as Siamese twins and the life of one is essential to that of the other. This initial impulse would be followed up by the moral influence, if not positive action, of the new government, and by the growing spirit of liberalism throughout the world, and the ultimate removal of all restraints upon trade would be the inevitable outcome.

A natural result of centralized world authority would be the standardization of all the elements of trade relations. A uniform system of weights and measures, uniform postage rates, uniform currency and coinage would be adopted in all international intercourse.

Diversity of language, that greatest of obstacles to freer intercourse and better acquaintance among the inhabitants of the earth, could not indeed be eliminated but it could be progressively diminished through the influence of the central authority. The uniform tendency of civilization has been to reduce the multiplicity of tongues originally existing and to promote unification of

language. A centralization of political interests, with its resulting competition of languages, would powerfully accelerate this tendency.

The immense inconvenience and often the gross injustice which arises from the varying systems of law in force among different nations would naturally be one of the matters to receive early attention of a central government. So far as its power would permit it would establish a uniform code of laws so that the world might enjoy, in the words of a distinguished English jurist, those "vast material advantages of unified law, security and peace of mind, and ease in the despatch of business, which would come to the ship-owner, the underwriter, the banker, and the merchant if each knew that in every other foreign country the law of contract, the law of movable property and the law of civil wrongs were practically identical with those of his own country." Next to the unification of language the unification of law would be perhaps the most powerful agency in uniting the divergent interests of the race and it would be far the easier consummation of the two to accomplish.

One effect of the creation of a central government would be the early elimination of the consular service as it now exists and the substitution therefor of a simpler and more efficient yet far less expensive system. There is no reason why one well-equipped consular office in any city should not serve the world at large to better advantage than the great number of offices now maintained in each of the larger cities.

Less rapidly but not less surely, the ambassadorial function of States would be shorn of much of its former importance. But this would really be only an acceleration of a process which has long been going on. The transcendent importance of diplomacy and the almost sovereign powers of ambassadors a century ago, when international relations were so unsettled and slow communication with home threw high responsibility upon diplomatic agents, has steadily diminished as intercourse by mail and telegraph has improved, until cabinets have come to conduct negotiations with a directness which was formerly quite impossible. The establishment of the new order

would continue this tendency. Moreover, subjects which were once the peculiar province of diplomacy would be taken over by the new authority. Secret treaties and all alliances would cease to exist. Intrigue, the chief characteristic of the old diplomacy, would find its occupation gone, for publicity in the dealings of nations, as well as in those of men, makes for honesty and fairness. Likewise simplicity would supplant complexity in international relations. Where formerly each State treated with every other on an independent basis, making thousands of separate laws and agreements, there would be a uniform system of international law emanating from a single source to which all separate treaties or agreements would have to conform.

That the influence of an effective world organization, with its freedom from the burdens of war and armed peace and from artificial restraints upon trade would profoundly stimulate progress in the more backward nations like Russia, Turkey and the countries of Asia will scarcely be questioned. Commerce, with its railroads and tele-

graphs and diffusion of practical knowledge, is a mighty leveller of caste and prejudice, and commerce in all its phases would be promoted by the new order. A universal "open door," far from handicapping the commercial ambitions of nations, would give them freer play, because divested of all suspicion of political aggression.

In forecasting the influence of world organization upon material development, moral, social and industrial reforms, the most conservative estimate seems little short of unrestrained exaggeration. For it would amount to the release of a new and mighty force in the uplifting of the race. The change from non-useful to useful employment of the vast funds of capital and labor now wasted in war or armed peace would represent only a part of the gain. Equally important would be the diversion to useful ends of the prodigious current of mental energy which is now swallowed up in the vast abyss of war. The military and naval services have always absorbed the best practical talent of the race. This condition would be brought to a close. The energy now

wasted in devising wonderful implements of destruction, planning campaigns and organizing vast military movements would find an outlet in all directions in work for the betterment of human conditions. In the realm of mind as well as in material things men would beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks, even surpassing the reality of Isaiah's beautiful vision.

In the sphere of public works there is scarcely anything which now is considered physically at all practicable that might not be accomplished within a period of fifty years under the conditions assumed and still not trench heavily upon, much less exhaust, the resources which would become available. Reservoirs, flood protection on the great rivers, irrigation, forests, tunnels through mountain ranges, works of navigation—all that might be desired in these directions would cost but a small part of what will be squandered upon militarism if the present regime continues. This statement is not made from any sympathy with the conventional pacifist illustration of the money

equivalent of a battleship in schools, Y. M. C. A's and churches, but as a conservative parallel of costs in the line of practical and useful enterprises. What use the world might actually make of all these released forces it is of course impossible to say; but assuming that they would be turned to account with the same efficiency now applied to military purposes, there is almost no limit which may be set to their practical accomplishment. It is quite within bounds to say that, with an economic application of its energies and resources, the earth can be made to sustain, in greater comfort than at present, ten times its existing population.

Most important of all, because the outgrowth of all the rest, would be the social, industrial and moral uplift of human conditions. Something more than a consenting mind, a recognition of evils and a willingness to act is necessary for progress along these lines. Resources are indispensable, and the intellectual and material husbandry from discarded militarism would in a large degree meet this imperious demand. And every step

upward in material well-being, whether of men or nations, will be a step upward in moral well-being. The glory of the peace cause lies not altogether in the abolition of war but in lifting the moral tone of society to a plane where war will seem an abomination. This applies not only to war between nations, but to the scarcely less iniquitous strife which still flourishes under legal sanction in the social, industrial and commercial relations of men. Confidence and trust must dethrone suspicion; friendship must drive out hatred; coöperation must supplant antagonism, and men must realize that living for the common welfare is a duty no less honorable and far more useful than that of dying for their country.


Those who picture the millennium of peace as a literal fulfilment of Tennyson's vision in which "the kindly earth shall slumber lapt in universal law"; who forecast it as a reign of ease and femininity devoid of the virility and force of "the strenuous life," hold a very different conception from that of the author of this book. Far from slumbering, in any other sense than as a respite

from the wickedness of war, the whole earth will awaken to new life. Militarism itself, rightly estimated, is a breeder of sloth, for it suppresses rather than promotes those normal activities upon which the welfare of the race depends. When these activities are unrestrained and man's energies are all directed to promotion of the common welfare, there will be an inspiration of effort and purpose such as the world has not yet experienced; and results will be realized which will make even the vast achievements of the present day pale in comparison. Lapt in universal law the earth will indeed be, but the liberty assured by this very fact will release forces now pent up by fear, distrust, and repressive laws, and the spirit of humanity will come forth into freer and larger expression.


This dream of the ages past, this partial realization of the present, let no one doubt that it will persist until lost in its full reality. Whether this reality come swiftly, like the fast-growing grain which the sower himself reaps, or as the slow-maturing growth of a giant forest tree, is not the

chief consideration here. The greatness of the result counts more than celerity of attainment. Grant, indeed, that it be not long delayed; but, far or near, the time *will* come as surely as humanity continues its progress toward better things.

THE END







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